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“Standing” in the Shadow of Erie: 
Federalism in the Balance in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry 
 
Glenn S. Koppel* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Consider the following Erie issue: For the purpose of 
deciding whether the official proponents of a California 
initiative have Article III standing to appeal a lower court 
judgment declaring the initiative unconstitutional—admittedly 
a question of federal law under Article III’s “case-or-
controversy” provision—should a federal appeals court apply 
California state law, as interpreted by that state’s Supreme 
Court, authorizing the proponents to assert the state’s 
particularized interest in defending the validity of the 
challenged initiative, or should the federal court apply federal 
standing law requiring a text-based, formal agency 
relationship between the State of California, as principal, and 
the initiative proponents, as its agent? In other words, is the 
scope of Article III broad enough to encompass, and therefore 
govern, the question of the initiative proponents’ authority to 
assert the State’s interest in federal court and, thereby, 
preempt state law on this question?1 
This Erie issue2 confronted the U.S. Supreme Court in 
 
*  Professor of Law, Western State College of Law; J.D., Harvard Law 
School; A.B., City College of New York. I am grateful to Dean Allen Easley 
and Professor Thomas D. Rowe for their invaluable comments on earlier 
drafts. 
1. See Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1011 (Cal. 2011) (framing the 
issue in the following terms: “the role that state law plays in determining 
whether, under federal law, an individual or entity possesses standing to 
participate as a party in a federal proceeding.”). 
2. While the Erie doctrine typically applies to issues arising in diversity 
suits, it is also applicable to “questions of state law arising in a nondiversity 
case,” like Hollingsworth. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S 
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 563 (6th ed. 2009) (“But what 
1
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Hollingsworth v. Perry,3 one of the two same-sex marriage 
cases decided by the Supreme Court in June 2013. In 
Hollingsworth, the Court avoided ruling on the merits of the 
constitutionality of Proposition 8 because a five-Justice 
majority found that the initiative’s proponents lacked standing 
to appeal the judgment of the district court that invalidated the 
proposition.4 And yet, neither the Court’s Opinion nor the 
dissent refers to Erie doctrine in analyzing this essentially 
vertical choice-of-law question. 
 This Article provides an insight into the Court’s 
divergent views on the federal standing issue in Hollingsworth 
by viewing the Justices’ conflicting positions through the lens 
of the Court’s Erie jurisprudence, which, at its core, focuses on 
calibrating the proper judicial balance of power in a given case 
between conflicting federal and state interests in determining 
vertical choice-of-law issues. Hollingsworth is uniquely 
positioned at the intersection of federal standing principles and 
Erie doctrine, confronting the Court with competing balance of 
power concerns inherent in our federal system. Standing, as a 
requirement for the limited exercise of federal judicial power 
under Article III, addresses the horizontal balance of power 
among the three branches of the federal government. Erie 
addresses the vertical balance of power between federal and 
state courts. Standing is a malleable doctrine that federal 
courts have employed to avoid ruling —prematurely in the case 
of same-sex marriage—on the merits of a controversial issue. 
This Article employs Erie doctrine to critically assess whether a 
closely divided Supreme Court in Hollingsworth correctly 
privileged the horizontal balance of power concerns at the 
expense of the vertical ones. 
Achieving a proper balance between federal and state 
 
of questions of state law arising in a nondiversity case? See Maternally Yours 
v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 540-41 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956), where the 
court said, with respect to a supplemental state law claim in a federal 
question case: ‘[I]t is the source of the right sued upon, and not the ground on 
which federal jurisdiction is founded, that determines the governing law. * * * 
Thus, the Erie doctrine applies, whatever the ground for federal jurisdiction, 
to any issue or claim which has its source in state law.’ That understanding 
has gained general acceptance.”). 
3. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
4. See id. at 2662-63. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4
  
2014] “STANDING” IN THE SHADOW OF ERIE 633 
interests in resolving difficult Erie issues periodically confronts 
the Court whenever a case presents a potential conflict 
between federal and state law.5 An essentially functionalist 
enterprise, this interest balancing process was first explicitly 
articulated by the Court in its 1958 decision in Byrd v. Blue 
Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.,6 which replaced the 
“mechanistic”7 test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York8 that 
privileged outcome-determinative state law, including 
technically “procedural” law over federal law including—it was 
feared by some commentators at the time9—federal procedural 
rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act.10 Even after 
the Court, in Hanna v. Plumer, held that a Federal Rule, 
validly promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act and broad 
enough to cover the issue in dispute, prevails over conflicting 
state law regardless of outcome difference,11 Byrd’s interest 
balancing approach to vertical choice-of-law issues continues to 
influence, explicitly or implicitly, the Court’s Erie decision-
making, most recently in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 
Inc., 12 in 1996, and Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. 
 
5. See infra Part III. 
6. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
7. See Paul J. Katz, Standing in Good Stead: State Courts, Federal 
Standing Doctrine, and Reverse-Erie Analysis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1326 
(2005) (discussing the recanting of the mechanistic test). 
8. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
9. See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4508 (2d ed. 1996) (“In the wake 
of [the] three 1949 decisions [that followed York] many observers believed 
that there was no longer much, if any, room for independent federal 
regulation of procedure.”). 
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
11. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
12. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). But see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for 
Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court Is Doing a 
Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
963, 1007-1008 (Yet much as I may disagree with Professor Floyd when he 
asserts that “[t]he Gasperini majority relied centrally on Byrd” (cite 
omitted)—for the Court does not engage in Byrd-style balancing to decide on 
the allocation of trial- and appellate-level responsibilities, and Byrd plays no 
role in the choice of standard for verdict-excessiveness review—the opinion 
largely earns his criticism that “Byrd still lives, but we know not why, or to 
what extent.” (cite omitted). About all we get from the Gasperini opinion is 
the apparent direction not to rely solely on “outcome determination” analysis 
in decisional-federal-law “cases presenting countervailing federal interests,” 
518 U.S. at 432.) 
3
  
634 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
Allstate Insurance Co.13 in 2010. 
Wright, Miller & Cooper commented, before the 
Hollingsworth decision, that “[l]ittle attention has been paid to 
the question whether state law may have some independent 
influence on standing.”14 I have been able to locate only one 
article that explores in depth the relationship between 
standing and Erie15 but did so as a reverse-Erie question—
whether state courts are constitutionally required under the 
Supremacy Clause to apply federal standing requirements 
when adjudicating federal claims. When does Congress’ 
“substantive interest in uniform enforcement of its policies [in 
state courts] outweigh[] a state’s interest in maintaining its 
own justiciability limits[?]”16 It is settled law that state courts 
are not bound by Article III’s case or controversy 
requirement.17 The author, however, applies the Byrd-
 
13. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
14. 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.14 (3d ed. 2008). 
15. For another reference to federal standing and Erie, see William A. 
Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy" Requirement in State Court Adjudication 
of Federal Questions, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 263, 295, note 143 (1990) (“Further, 
under my theory of standing as a matter of substantive law . . . state 
standing law should be binding on the federal courts, just as other 
substantive state law currently binds the federal courts under the Erie 
doctrine. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Thus, a state court 
determination of standing to enforce state substantive law should be binding 
on the federal courts.”). 
16. Katz, supra note 7, at 1331 (arguing that state standing rules “affect 
the behavior of potential litigants and the courts” and, therefore, have a 
substantive impact of the uniform enforcement of federally created rights). 
17. See, e.g., Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. 
REV. 1257, 1260, 1272 (2011) (“This is so because the Supreme Court's recent 
justiciability case law ties its hands in such cases. The Court has held that 
federal justiciability requirements are constitutionally mandated constraints 
on federal jurisdiction, applicable not only to the original jurisdiction of lower 
federal courts, but also to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. In 
contrast, most state courts treat the doctrines of standing, mootness, and 
ripeness as discretionary, holding that they possess broad discretion to hear 
cases that are moot or unripe, or in which the plaintiff lacks standing. State 
justiciability law is a question of state court jurisdiction, which is a matter 
generally committed to the authority of state government, rather than one 
imposed by the federal Constitution. From these principles, the Court has 
deduced that it lacks jurisdiction over state court determinations of federal 
law rendered in cases that would not satisfy federal justiciability standards . . 
. . The Supreme Court, too, has repeatedly acknowledged the principle that, 
as a matter of sovereignty, state courts are free to apply their own 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4
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balancing approach to weigh the interest of state courts in 
applying their own—”procedural”—standing rules against the 
“substantive” interest of Congress in the uniform enforcement 
of federal rights in all state courts across the nation, and 
concludes that the federal interest in the application by state 
courts of uniform federal standing principles should prevail.18 
This Article proposes that the Court’s majority and dissenting 
opinions in Hollingsworth can be similarly understood in terms 
of Byrd-style balancing of competing federal and state 
interests. 
Also at play in Erie jurisprudence in resolving potential 
conflicts between federal and state laws is the unresolved 
tension between formalism and functionalism in the 
interpretation of legal text, a thread that weaves its way 
through the Court’s Erie case law.19 The pendulum of the 
Court’s Erie jurisprudence has swung over the years between a 
formalist approach that favors a principled, bright-line rule 
aimed at achieving the benefits of uniformity and 
predictability, and a functionalist approach that favors “getting 
it right” on a case-by-case basis by inquiring into the purpose 
behind the state rule to discern whether there are substantive 
interests at stake that should be respected in federal court 
decision-making. This formalist-functionalist tension is also 
manifested in the majority and dissenting opinions in 
 
conceptions of justiciability and are not bound by Article III's limitations on 
federal court jurisdiction.”). 
18. Also see Fletcher, supra note 15 at 282, note 92: “My thesis may be 
quickly stated: Standing determinations are decisions on the merits rather 
than jurisdictional decisions. Whether a plaintiff has standing depends on the 
particular statutory or constitutional provisions under which she brings suit. 
Article III imposes no standing-based "case or controversy" limitations except 
in feigned cases when a plaintiff lies about an injury she claims to suffer, and 
in cases where Congress grants standing as a mechanism to solicit a judicial 
opinion to which Congress desires an answer. If standing decisions are 
understood, as I think they should be, as decisions on the merits, it 
necessarily follows that state courts should be required under the supremacy 
clause to abide by federal standing doctrine. Although I believe this approach 
is correct, I have refrained from relying on it in this Article.” 
19. See generally Glenn S. Koppel, The Fruits of Shady Grove: Seeing the 
Forest for the Trees, 44 AKRON L. REV. 999 (2011) [hereinafter The Fruits of 
Shady Grove]; Glenn S. Koppel, The Functional and Dysfunctional Role of 
Formalism in Federalism: Shady Grove Versus Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 905 (2012). 
5
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Hollingsworth. 
In Perry v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit panel adopted a 
functionalist approach to federal court standing by narrowly 
construing the scope of Article III standing law to create room 
for the application of state law—in deference to California’s 
state interests—to determine a question it termed “antecedent 
to determining federal standing[:] . . . who is authorized to 
assert the People’s interest in the constitutionality of an 
initiative measure?”20 When the Ninth Circuit certified this 
question to the California Supreme Court, it seemed to this 
puzzled author to be an unassailable principle that the federal 
judiciary has an overriding interest, as an independent judicial 
system, in determining that question as a matter of federal 
standing law rooted in Article III’s case-or-controversy 
provision, without regard to conflicting state law. Upon further 
reflection, based upon a careful reading of the opinions of the 
California Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit panel in Perry 
v. Brown, and the U.S. Supreme Court in Hollingsworth, I 
realized that important sovereign state interests in self-
government warranted a narrow construction of Article III 
standing doctrine. The California Supreme Court responded, in 
functional terms, that “[t]he initiative power would be 
significantly impaired if there were no one to assert the state’s 
interest in the validity of the measure when elected officials 
decline to defend it in court or to appeal a judgment 
invalidating the measure[,]”21 and held: 
 
[W]hen the public officials who ordinarily defend 
a challenged state law or appeal a judgment 
invalidating the law decline to do so, under 
article II, section 8 of the California Constitution 
and the relevant provisions of the Elections 
Code, the official proponents of a voter-approved 
initiative measure are authorized to assert the 
state’s interest in the initiative’s validity, 
enabling the proponents to defend the 
constitutionality of the initiative and to appeal a 
 
20. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis 
added). 
21. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1024 (Cal. 2011). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4
  
2014] “STANDING” IN THE SHADOW OF ERIE 637 
judgment invalidating the initiative.22 
 
The Ninth Circuit panel adopted the Supreme Court of 
California’s holding in Perry v. Brown as the basis for the 
panel’s holding that the official proponents of Proposition 8 had 
federal appellate standing to assert the interests of the State of 
California.23 Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in 
Hollingsworth agreed with the panel’s functionalist analysis 
that “[p]roper resolution of the justiciability question requires, 
in this case, a threshold determination of state law”24 and that 
state law governs the authority of initiative proponents to 
assert, in federal court, the State’s interest in “the integrity of 
its initiative process.”25 
The Supreme Court’s five-Justice majority rejected the 
Ninth Circuit’s functionalist ruling in favor of what appears, at 
least on the surface, to be a rigidly formalist approach that 
broadly construes the reach of Article III standing doctrine to 
control the authority of initiative proponents under state law to 
represent the State’s interest in federal court. The Court’s 
majority and dissenting opinions in Hollingsworth appear to 
align along formalist versus functionalist lines, suggestive of 
the Court’s past Erie decisions. These decisions have oscillated 
between formalist bright-line tests and flexible functional tests 
that create room for consideration of any competing 
substantive state interests at stake. Most recently the Court 
used a bright-line test in Shady Grove,26 where another five-
Justice majority ruled that the literal text of the federal class 
action rule preempted a “conflicting” state class action rule. 
The Court used a flexible functional test in Gasperini, where 
the federal rule governing new trial motions was narrowly 
construed to avoid a conflict with state substantive interests in 
controlling runaway jury verdicts that underlay New York’s 
procedural statute giving state courts increased scrutiny over 
 
22. Id. at 1033. 
23. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1075. 
24. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
25. Id. 
26. See infra Part III. 
7
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jury awards.27 
The Court in Hollingsworth ruled that—to confer federal 
standing on initiative proponents—federal standing principles 
require that state law explicitly—by legal text—appoint 
initiative sponsors “as agents of the people . . . to defend . . . the 
constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State.”28 The 
Court’s majority found lacking “the most basic features of an 
agency relationship” consistent with the Restatement of 
Agency.29 In the absence of a fiduciary relationship between 
initiative proponents and the State, the former would merely 
be asserting their own generalized interest instead of the 
State’s particularized interest: “And no matter its reasons, the 
fact that a State thinks a private party should have standing to 
seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot override our 
settled law to the contrary.”30 As noted by one commentator, 
“[t]he California Supreme Court’s holding that California law 
allows for proponents of initiatives to represent the State’s 
interest was not grounded in the text of a statute or any 
provision of the California State Constitution.”31 This Article 
proposes that the Court’s requirement of a “textual basis . . . for 
delegation of [a] State’s Article III standing[,]”32 consistent with 
the Restatement, is formalist in its inflexibility which is not 
warranted given the malleable nature of federal standing law. 
However, a deeper analysis of the Hollingsworth opinions 
from an Erie perspective reveals, instead, a stark contrast 
 
27. See generally Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 
(1996). 
28. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666 (citing Arizonans for Official 
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997)) (“we [we]re aware of no Arizona 
law appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to 
defend, in lieu of public officials, the constitutionality of initiatives made law 
of the State”). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 2667 (emphasis added). 
31. Corrine Blalock, Hollingsworth v. Perry: Expressive Harm and the 
Stakes of “Marriage”, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 217, 234 
(2013); see also Marty Lederman, Understanding Standing: The Court’s 
Article III Questions in the Same-Sex Marriage Cases (VII), SCOTUSBLOG 
(Jan. 21, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/01/understanding-
standing-the-courts-article-iii-questions-in-the-same-sex-marriage-cases-vii/ 
(referring to the California’s Supreme Court’s functionalist reasoning as 
“untethered to text and precedent”). 
32. Blalock, supra note 31, at 234. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4
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between two conflicting functionalist views in terms of 
balancing the federal and state interests at stake and the 
potential harms to each interest that would result from 
application of federal or state law to the question of the 
proponent’s authority to assert the state’s interest in defending 
Proposition 8 in federal court. The majority’s requirement of a 
formal agency relationship is grounded in its functionalist 
concern with “preserv[ing] the federal courts’ Article III role”33 
and conflicts with the dissent’s functionalist concern with 
preserving the integrity of the State’s initiative process. 
Part II provides a brief background of the Hollingsworth 
opinions. Part III briefly narrates the evolution of Erie 
jurisprudence from a mechanistically-applied outcome 
determinative test that favored state substantive interests over 
federal interests in the uniform application of the federal rules, 
to a flexible, functional approach, in Byrd,34 that restored some 
equilibrium to the federal/state judicial balance by 
counterbalancing “outcome determination” with the interests of 
the federal courts as an independent judicial system. This 
Byrd-based balancing equation implicitly—if not explicitly—
has informed the Court’s subsequent Erie decisions from 
Hanna through Gasperini, to Shady Grove.35 
Part IV critically evaluates each side’s warnings in 
Hollingsworth that a Pandora’s box would be opened—
undermining the foundations of either Article III standing or 
California’s initiative process—if federal standing law or 
California state law were applied, and demonstrates that the 
majority and dissenting opinions reflect this Byrd-based 
interest-balancing approach to the vertical choice of law issue 
in dispute. Part IV concludes that the majority “got it wrong” in 
terms of Erie doctrine by overstating the harm to the federal 
interest in keeping the exercise of judicial power within the 
confines of Article III at the expense of substantial harm to 
California’s interest in the integrity of its initiative process. 
 
33. Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents on the Issue of Standing at 28, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. 
Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 768643, at *28. 
34. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
35. See generally Richard D. Freer & Thomas C. Arthur, The 
Irrepressible Influence of Byrd, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 61 (2010). 
9
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This Article does not take a position on the merits of the 
initiative process. A respectable case can be made that the 
legislative dysfunction that gave rise to the initiative power in 
the early Twentieth Century has gradually warped that power 
in the current century as interest groups—including some 
located out-of-state—funnel financial resources to finance 
media campaigns in support of controversial initiatives, as 
occurred in the run-up to the passage of Proposition 8.36 
 
II. A Synopsis of Hollingsworth v. Perry: The Standing Issue 
in Context 
 
Appellate standing was a threshold issue in both 
Hollingsworth v. Perry and United States v. Windsor, the two 
“same-sex” marriage cases before the Court. Applying federal 
law requiring petitioners to have suffered “a concrete and 
particularized” injury, standing was upheld in Windsor but 
denied in Hollingsworth. 
 
 
 
 
36. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley & Kirk Johnson, Mormons Tipped Scale in 
Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2008, at A1 (“As proponents of 
same-sex marriage across the country planned protests on Saturday 
against the ban, interviews with the main forces behind the ballot 
measure showed how close its backers believe it came to defeat — and 
the extraordinary role Mormons played in helping to pass it with 
money, institutional support and dedicated volunteers. ‘We’ve spoken 
out on other issues, we’ve spoken out on abortion, we’ve spoken out on 
those other kinds of things,’ said Michael R. Otterson, the managing 
director of public affairs for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, as the Mormons are formally called, in Salt Lake City. ‘But we 
don’t get involved to the degree we did on this.” . . . In the end, 
Protect Marriage estimates, as much as half of the nearly $40 million 
raised on behalf of the measure was contributed by Mormons.”); see 
also Proposition 8—Tracking the money: Final Numbers, L.A. TIMES 
(Feb 3, 2009, 6:21PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-
moneymap,0,1777132.htmlstory#axzz2xBWVIM6v (Approximately 
30% of the money raised in support of Prop 8 ($13,254,350 out of at 
total $44,103,525) and 28% of the money raised in opposition to Prop 
8 ($11,224,394 out of a total $38,766,260) came from outside 
California.); see generally Allen K. Easley, Buying Back the First 
Amendment: Regulation of Disproportionate Corporate Spending in 
Ballot Issue Campaigns, 17 GA. L. REV. 675 (1983). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4
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A. United States v. Windsor 
 
Edith Windsor, who married her same sex partner in a 
lawful ceremony in Canada, sought to claim the estate tax 
exemption granted by U.S. tax law for surviving spouses. 
Windsor, however, was barred from doing so by § 3 of the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) which excludes a same-sex 
partner from the definition of “spouse.”37 In her federal district 
court suit seeking a tax refund denied her by the IRS, Windsor 
claimed that § 3 was unconstitutional. Although the 
government continued to enforce § 3 by not paying Windsor the 
refund, the Justice Department, on the President’s instruction, 
did not defend it. The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) 
of the House of Representatives intervened to defend § 3’s 
constitutionality. The federal district court invalidated § 3 as 
unconstitutional and ordered the Government to pay Windsor a 
refund which, continuing to enforce DOMA, it refused to do. 
The United States appealed to the Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed the district court’s judgment, and the case 
subsequently went to the Supreme Court. BLAG appeared as 
amicus curiae. The Government appealed, but declined to 
defend the lower court decisions on the merits, in order to 
obtain a Supreme Court ruling invalidating § 3 of DOMA.38 
The Court did not have to decide whether BLAG had 
Article III standing because, according to Justice Kennedy’s 
Opinion of the Court, the Government, as petitioner, continued 
to suffer a real and immediate economic “injury to the national 
Treasury if payment is made,” payment of “money that [the 
U.S.] would not disburse but for the court’s order.”39 This 
despite the fact that the Government agreed with Ms. Windsor 
that the provision of DOMA that denied her the same benefits 
as a heterosexual married couple received under the federal tax 
laws was unconstitutional and welcomed the district court’s 
order to refund the money. The Court held: [E]ven where “the 
 
37. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013). 
38. Id. at 2686 (“That the Executive may welcome this order to 
pay the refund if it is accompanied by the constitutional ruling it 
wants does not eliminate the injury to the national Treasury if 
payment is made, or to the taxpayer if it is not.”). 
39. Id. . 
11
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Government largely agree[s] with the opposing party on the 
merits of the controversy, there is sufficient adverseness and 
an adequate basis for jurisdiction in the fact that the 
Government intended to enforce the challenged law against 
that party.”40 
A weakness in the majority’s finding of “sufficient 
adverseness,” based on the Government’s intent to enforce § 3, 
is the Government’s agreement with the plaintiff’s position 
that § 3 is unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy acknowledged 
that the “Executive’s agreement with Windsor’s legal argument 
raises the risk that instead of a ‘real, earnest and vital 
controversy’ the Court faces a ‘friendly, non-adversary, 
proceeding . . . [in which] ‘a party beaten in the legislature 
[seeks to] transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the 
constitutionality of the legislative act.’”41 Noting that “this case 
is not routine,”42 he minimized the problem in two ways. First, 
by characterizing adverseness as a “prudential problem[],” 
Justice Kennedy downgraded adverseness from a required 
element of standing to a flexible “prudential consideration”43 
subject to the Court’s discretion. Second, he relied on BLAG, a 
non-party participating solely in an amicus curiae capacity, to 
shore up Government’s ineffectual defense, noting that 
“BLAG’s sharp adversarial presentation of the issues satisfies 
the prudential concerns that otherwise might counsel against 
hearing an appeal from a decision with which the principal 
parties agree.”44 
 
40. Id. at 2686-87 (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
41. Id. at 2687 (alteration in original); see also id. at 2689 (“The 
Court’s jurisdictional holding, it must be underscored, does not mean 
the arguments for dismissing this dispute on prudential grounds lack 
substance.”). 
42. Id. at 2689 (“[T]he merits question . . . is one of immediate 
importance to the Federal Government and to hundreds of thousands 
of persons. These circumstances support the Court’s decision to 
proceed to the merits.”). 
43. Id. at 2687 (emphasis added). 
44. Id. at 2688-89 (emphasizing that “[t]he Court’s jurisdictional 
holding . . . does not mean the arguments for dismissing the dispute 
on prudential grounds lack substance” cautioning that “there is no 
suggestion here that it is appropriate for the Executive as a matter of 
course to challenge statutes in the judicial forum rather than making 
the case to Congress for their amendment or repeal”). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4
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 Justice Scalia challenged the Court’s reliance on amici 
curiae to provide a vigorous defense of the challenged statute, 
contending that 
 
[T]he existence of a controversy is not a 
‘prudential’ requirement that we have invented, 
but an essential element of an Article III case or 
controversy. The majority’s notion that a case 
between friendly parties can be entertained so 
long as ‘adversarial presentation of the issues is 
assured by the participation of amici curiae 
prepared to defend with vigor’ the other side of 
the issue . . . effects a breathtaking revolution in 
our Article III jurisprudence.45 
 
In contrast to the Windsor majority’s reliance on BLAG’s 
ability to sharpen the issues for the Court, the majority in 
Hollingsworth cast doubt on the value of the Proposition 8 
proponents’ adversarial presentation, noting that they “answer 
to no one . . . decide for themselves, with no review, what 
arguments to make and how to make them[,]”46 and “are free to 
pursue a purely ideological commitment to the law’s 
constitutionality . . . .”47 
 
B. Hollingsworth v. Perry 
 
Unlike Windsor where the Court did not have to decide 
whether BLAG had appellate standing because the Justice 
Department had petitioned on behalf of the United States, in 
Hollingsworth the state officials who were the named 
defendants in the district court suit declined to appeal the 
judgment invalidating Proposition 8, leaving the official 
initiative proponents as the only petitioners before the Court of 
Appeal and the Supreme Court. Consequently, the standing 
issue before the Ninth Circuit, in Perry v. Brown, and the 
Supreme Court, in Hollingsworth, focused exclusively on 
 
45. Id. at 2702 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
46. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2013). 
47. Id. at 2667. 
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whether the initiative proponents had appellate standing to 
assert either their own interest or the state’s interest. As noted 
by Professor Lederman, 
 
the Court [had] little choice but to decide 
whether the Proposition 8 proponents have 
Article III standing to appeal in Hollingsworth v. 
Perry. The proponents are, after all, the only 
petitioners in that case, and in order to ensure 
the case remains fit for federal-court 
adjudication, ‘the parties must have the 
necessary stake not only at the outset of 
litigation, but throughout its course,’ including 
on appeal.48 
 
In 2008, the California Supreme Court held that limiting 
marriage to heterosexual couples violated the equal protection 
clause of the California Constitution.49 In reaction to that 
decision, California voters passed Proposition 8, which 
amended the California Constitution to provide that “[o]nly 
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California.”50 The plaintiffs in Hollingsworth, two same sex 
couples who wanted to be married, filed suit in federal court 
challenging Proposition 8 under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and naming 
as defendants the several state officials responsible for 
enforcing the state’s marriage laws. Although these state 
officials filed answers to the complaint, they refused to argue in 
favor of Proposition 8’s constitutionality.51 The district court 
allowed the official initiative proponents to intervene to defend 
Proposition 8. After a 12-day trial, the District Court declared 
Proposition 8 unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement by 
 
48. Marty Lederman, Understanding Standing: The Court’s 
Article III Questions in the Same-Sex Marriage Cases (V), 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 20, 2013, 7:46 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/01/understanding-standing-the-
courts-article-iii-questions-in-the-same-sex-marriage-cases-v/ 
(citations omitted). 
49. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659. 
50. Id. (alteration in original). 
51. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4
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“defendants and all persons under their control or supervision . 
. . .”52 Only the official proponents appealed the injunction to 
the Ninth Circuit; the government defendants did not. 
Concluding that the “Proponents’ standing to appeal 
depended on the precise rights and interests given to official 
sponsors of an initiative under California law, which ha[ve] 
never been clearly defined by the State’s highest court[,]” the 
Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the California 
Supreme Court: 
 
Whether under Article II, Section 8 of the 
California Constitution, or otherwise under 
California law, the official proponents of an 
initiative measure possess either a particularized 
interest in the initiative’s validity or the 
authority to assert the State’s interest in the 
initiative’s validity, which would enable them to 
defend the constitutionality of the initiative upon 
its adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating 
the initiative, when the public officials charged 
with that duty refuse to do so.53 
 
The California Supreme Court did not address whether 
official initiative proponents have a particularized interest in 
the initiative’s validity, focusing, instead, on whether 
proponents had the authority to assert the State’s interest. 
Unable to identify a “specific source of authority”54 grounded in 
the text of a statute or provision of the California Constitution 
or the initiative itself, the Court engaged in a functional 
interpretation of the state constitutional provision setting forth 
the People’s initiative power as well as the provisions of the 
Election Code relating to the proponent’s role in the initiative 
process. The Court concluded that the State’s interest in the 
integrity of the initiative power “would be significantly 
impaired if there were no one to assert the state’s interest in 
the validity of the measure when elected officials decline to 
 
52. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1139 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010). 
53. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1070 (emphasis added). 
54. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1024 (Cal. 2011). 
15
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defend it in court or to appeal a judgment invalidating the 
measure.”55 The Court held: 
 
[W]hen the public officials who ordinarily defend 
a challenged measure decline to do so, article II, 
section 8 of the California Constitution and the 
applicable provisions of the Elections Code 
authorize the official proponents of an initiative 
measure to intervene or to participate as real 
parties in interest in a judicial proceeding to 
assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s 
validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating 
the measure.56 
 
Also functionalist in nature—and especially significant in 
light of the closeness of the five-to-four split in the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Hollingsworth over the proper balance 
between federal and state interests—is the California Supreme 
Court’s reference to the primary purpose57 underlying the 
state’s initiative power “to afford the people the ability to 
propose and to adopt constitutional amendments or statutory 
provisions that their elected officials had refused or declined to 
adopt.”58 In the opinion of California’s high court, this purpose 
 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 1025. 
57. For an explanation of the nature of functionalism or 
instrumentalism, see BAILEY KULKIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY AND 
JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 145 (1994) (“Instrumentalist adjudication 
does not disregard the governing rule but application of the rule may 
be modified if strict application would undermine or fail to further the 
function intended to be achieved by the rule or the legal system of 
which it is a part.”). 
58. Perry, 265 P.3d at 1016 (emphasis added); see also Marty 
Lederman, Understanding Standing: The Court’s Article III Questions 
in the Same-Sex Marriage Cases (VI), SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2013, 
6:52 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/01/understanding-standing-the-
courts-article-iii-questions-in-the-same-sex-marriage-cases-vi/ (“[T]he state 
supreme court’s principal justification [for interpreting California law 
to authorize initiative proponents to represent the state’s interest in 
defending an initiative’s validity was] . . . frankly a functionalist 
one—namely, preservation of the efficacy of the California initiative 
process[.]”) [hereinafter Understanding Standing (VI)]. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4
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would be undermined if initiative proponents were unable to 
defend the measure, once adopted, when state officials refuse to 
do so.59 Also noteworthy, in light of the doubts expressed by the 
majority opinion in Hollingsworth about the qualifications of 
the proposition’s official proponents to represent the State’s 
interest60 on appeal, the California Supreme Court concluded 
that “the official proponents . . . have a unique relationship to 
the voter-approved measure that makes them especially likely 
to be reliable and vigorous advocates for the measure and to be 
so viewed by those whose votes secured the initiative’s 
enactment into law.”61 
At this point, the Ninth Circuit panel confronted a classic 
Erie choice-of-law issue. For the purpose of determining federal 
appellate standing, should the federal court apply California 
law that “confers on the official proponents of an initiative the 
authority to assert the State’s interests in defending the 
constitutionality of that initiative, where the state officials who 
would ordinarily assume that responsibility choose not to do 
so?”62 Or is the proponents’ authority to represent the State’s 
interest on appeal in federal court governed by federal standing 
principles under Article III? 
The panel narrowly interpreted the reach of Article III 
standing jurisprudence to conclude that, as a matter of vertical 
federalism, federal law does not control this issue. A conflict 
between Article III jurisprudence and state law, as interpreted 
by the California Supreme Court in Perry v. Brown, was 
 
59. See Perry, 265 P.3d at 1022 (noting that the “enhanced risk 
[that public officials may not defend the approved initiative measure 
with vigor] is attributable to the unique nature and purpose of the 
initiative power, which gives the people the right to adopt into law 
measures that their elected officials have not adopted and may often 
oppose”). 
60. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666, 2667, 2671 
(2013) (In contrast to the Windsor majority’s reliance on BLAG’s 
ability to sharpen the merits issues for the Court, the majority in 
Hollingsworth, seemed to cast doubt on the value of the Prop 8 
proponents’ adversarial presentation, noting that they “answer to no 
one,” “decide for themselves with no review, what arguments to make 
and how to make them,” and “are free to pursue a purely ideological 
commitment to the law’s constitutionality . . . .”). 
61. Perry, 265 P.3d at 1024 (emphasis added). 
62. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012). 
17
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thereby avoided. While acknowledging that state law does not 
have the “power directly to enlarge or contract federal 
jurisdiction” since “[s]tanding to sue in any Article III court is, 
of course, a federal question which does not depend on the 
party’s . . . standing in state court,” the panel ruled that 
“[s]tate law does have the power, however, to answer questions 
antecedent to determining federal standing, such as the one 
here: who is authorized to assert the People’s interest in the 
constitutionality of an initiative measure[.]”63 
The panel engaged in an Erie-style analysis of the balance 
of power in vertical federalism, coming down heavily in favor of 
respecting 
 
[the states’] prerogative, as independent 
sovereigns, to decide for themselves who may 
assert their interests and under what 
circumstances, and to bestow that authority 
accordingly. . . . Principles of federalism require 
that federal courts respect such decisions by the 
states as to who may speak for them: “there are 
limits on the Federal Government’s power to 
affect the internal operations of a State.”64 
 
The panel stressed California’s unique commitment to the 
People’s initiative power and the key role the ballot initiative 
plays in California’s governmental structure, and agreed with 
the contention of the State’s highest court that “[t]he initiative 
power would be significantly impaired if there were no one to 
assert the state’s interest” in defending the measure on appeal 
when state officials refused to do so.65 The panel’s opinion did 
not address “whether, under California law, the official 
proponents also possess a particularized interest in a voter-
approved initiative’s validity[,]”66 holding only that: 
 
Because the State of California has Article III 
 
63. Id. at 1074-75 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
64. Id. at 1071 (citations omitted). 
65. Id. at 1073 (alteration in original) (quoting Perry, 265 P.3d at 
1024). 
66. Id. at 1074 (citing Perry, 265 P.3d at 1015). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4
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standing to defend the constitutionality of 
Proposition 8, and because both the California 
Constitution and California law authorize “the 
official proponents of [an] initiative . . . to appear 
and assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s 
validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating 
the measure when the public officials who 
ordinarily defend the measure or appeal such a 
judgment declined to do so,” we conclude that 
Proponents are proper appellants here.67 
 
As discussed in Part IV, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Hollingsworth sharply divided over the Ninth Circuit’s vision of 
vertical federalism in the context of federal standing and the 
appropriate balance to strike between federal and state 
interests. The majority affirmed that “standing in federal court 
is a question of federal law, not state law[]”68 and that the 
states cannot override the “vital [federal] interests going to the 
role of the Judiciary in our system of separated powers . . . 
simply by issuing to private parties who otherwise lack 
standing a ticket to the federal courthouse.”69 By contrast, the 
four-Justice dissent charged that “[t]he Court’s opinion 
disrespects and disparages both the political process in 
California and the well-stated opinion of the California 
Supreme Court in this case.”70 
The standing issue in Hollingsworth raised the vertical 
choice of law question whether state law can have some 
independent influence on federal appellate standing. In a 
federal question case concerning the constitutionality of a state 
initiative, does California state law govern an “antecedent” or 
“threshold” question whether the proponents of a state 
initiative are authorized to represent the State’s interest for 
the purpose of determining the standing of the proponents to 
appeal in federal court? Or, rather, does Article III control this 
question, requiring that, in order for the authority conferred on 
initiative proponents by state law to assert the state’s interest 
 
67. Id. at 1075 (citation omitted). 
68. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013). 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 2674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
19
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in defending an initiative to be sufficient to confer federal court 
standing on the proponents, that authority must meet the 
formal agency requirements of the Restatement (Third) of 
Agency? 
As noted earlier, Wright, Miller, & Cooper commented, 
before the Hollingsworth opinions were published, that “[l]ittle 
attention has been paid to the question whether state law may 
have some independent influence on standing.”71 In federal 
court diversity cases, there is precedent to support the 
application of state standing rules that would deny standing 
where federal standing doctrine recognizes standing. However, 
it is unclear whether, in federal diversity cases, where the 
court is adjudicating a state right, standing is never satisfied if 
recognized under state law but not under Article III 
principles.72 In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the district court 
exercised federal question jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiffs’ 
claim that Proposition 8 violated their federal constitutional 
rights. According to Wright, Miller, & Cooper, “[w]hen suit is 
brought in a federal court to enforce a claim of federal right, 
whether statutory or constitutional, the question of standing 
ordinarily is treated as a federal question”73 which is governed 
by federal law. As previously mentioned, even the Ninth 
Circuit panel conceded in Perry v. Brown, that “‘[s]tanding to 
sue in any Article III court is, of course, a federal question 
 
71. 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, at § 3531.14. 
72. See 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, at § 
3531.14 (“Of course state rules that recognize standing need not be 
honored if Article III requirements are not met, although Article III 
concepts should be sufficiently flexible to recognize state-created 
rights to proceed in the public interest. If a clear case should appear 
in which standing would be recognized by state rules but denied by 
prudential federal rules, the federal court would have to choose 
between the general obligation to exercise diversity jurisdiction and 
its doubts as to the wisdom of enforcing this state claim of this 
particular plaintiff. It does not seem likely that the same choice 
should be made for all cases. It might be appropriate to deny standing 
on the basis of strong prudential objections, particularly if the 
interests pursued by the plaintiff seem remote and the substantive 
issues are sensitive. This course would be a de facto form of 
abstention. On the other hand, state standing might well be honored 
if there is a reasonable ground for seeking decision and the 
prudential objections are relatively weak.”). 
73. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4
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which does not depend on the party’s . . . standing in state 
court.’”74 
In Hollingsworth, the Supreme Court’s five-to-four 
disagreement over the applicable law—federal or state—to 
determine the federal standing issue, based on the proponents’ 
authority under California law to assert the State’s interest on 
appeal, reflects core differences over the weight to be accorded 
competing federal and state interests. 
The majority placed overriding weight on the federal 
interest in confining the Judicial Power within Article III 
limits, a concern relating to the foundation of the federal 
tripartite governmental structure that dictates the application 
of federal standing law to safeguard that structure. Applying 
federal standing precedent, the majority ruled that the 
Proposition 8 proponents possessed only a “generalized” 
interest75 which did not satisfy “Article III’s requirement that a 
party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court seek relief for 
a personal, particularized injury [which] serves vital interests 
going to the role of the Judiciary in our system of separation of 
powers.”76 The Court imposed a formal, text-based “agency” 
requirement on the authority of a state to authorize private 
parties to represent the state’s interest in federal court. As a 
“gloss on Article III,” in Professor Lederman’s words,77 federal 
standing law, according the Court’s majority, requires that 
state law expressly appoint initiative proponents as the State’s 
agents to suffice for federal standing. The Court’s Opinion 
noted that the California Supreme Court “never described 
petitioners as ‘agents of the people,’ or of anyone else.”78 The 
initiative proponents were merely private parties, possessing 
only a generalized interest, who were not the State’s agents as 
“agency” is narrowly defined by the Restatement of Agency. 
Observing that the “basic features of an agency relationship 
are missing here,”79 the majority stressed the absence of a 
 
74. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1074 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985)). 
75. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2013). 
76. Id. at 2667. 
77. See Understanding Standing (VI), supra note 58. 
78. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666. 
79. Id. 
21
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fiduciary relationship between the proponents and the State: 
“[P]etitioners answer to no one; they decide for themselves, 
with no review, what arguments to make and how to make 
them.”80 This essentially formalist approach to the choice of law 
issue in Hollingsworth was driven by a functionalist “parade of 
horribles”81 that would be unleashed if California law were to 
override vital federal interests.82 The majority implied that, 
had California law appointed the initiative proponents as the 
State’s agents, that would satisfy federal standing law, but 
“[n]either the California Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit 
ever described the proponents as agents of the State, and they 
plainly do not qualify as such.”83 
By contrast, the dissent placed overriding weight on 
California’s interest in organizing its own governmental 
structure which dictates the application of California law 
giving “a proponent . . . the authority to appear in court and 
assert the State’s interest in defending an enacted initiative 
when the public officials charged with that duty refuse to do 
so.”84 In Justice Kennedy’s view, the state’s interest would be 
harmed by refusing to apply California law as interpreted by 
the state’s Supreme Court: “Giving the Governor and attorney 
 
80. Id. 
81. See Understanding Standing (VI), supra note 58. 
82. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666-67. 
83. Id. at 2667. Both parties argued Karcher and Arizonans to 
support their opposing views on the agency issue. See infra Part IV, 
for a discussion of these decisions. The Court’s Opinion acknowledged 
that the Proponents would have had federal standing if California 
state law had appointed them as the agents of the People to assert 
their interests in defending the initiative, noting that, in Karcher, 
New Jersey law “provide[d] for other officials to speak for the State in 
federal court[.]” Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664. Both parties in 
Hollingsworth cited the Court’s earlier decision in Arizonans for 
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997), which denied 
appellate standing to the official sponsors of the ballot initiative 
based, in part, on the absence of an “Arizona law appointing initiative 
sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to defend, in lieu of public 
officials, the constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State.” 
Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 65. The majority opinion 
in Hollingsworth rejected the proponents’ argument that California 
law appointed them agents of the People, noting that the California 
Supreme Court “never described petitioners as ‘agents of the people,’ 
or of anyone else.” Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666. 
84. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4
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general [a] de facto veto will erode one of the cornerstones of 
the State’s governmental structure.”85 While acknowledging 
that the “proponent’s standing to defend an initiative in federal 
court is a question of federal law[,]”86 the dissent agreed with 
the Ninth Circuit’s and the California Supreme Court’s 
functionalist reasoning that the authority of the proponents to 
assert the State’s interest in defending an initiative when the 
public officials refused to do so is “a threshold determination of 
state law”87 which must be applied by the federal courts to 
avoid undermining the “primary purpose” underlying the 
People’s initiative power.88 Justice Kennedy’s dissent also 
argued that the majority’s invocation of formal agency 
principles as a matter of federal standing law is misplaced, 
asserting that “the Restatement may offer no workable 
example of an agent representing a principal composed of 
nearly 40 million residents of a State[]”89 and that it is for the 
California Supreme Court, not federal law, to determine 
whether the proponents are sufficiently accountable to the 
People.90 He concluded that, “[c]ontrary to the Court’s 
suggestion, this Court’s precedents do not indicate that a 
formal agency relationship is necessary.”91 
The opinions’ words, taken at face value, indicate that the 
disagreement between the majority and the dissenting justices 
concerns the perennial Erie question of the appropriate balance 
to strike, in vertical choice of law, between competing federal 
and state interests. Chief Justice Roberts, speaking for the 
majority, viewed as paramount the “vital [federal] interests 
going to the role of the Judiciary in our system of separated 
powers.”92 This overriding federal concern with maintaining 
 
85. Id. at 2671. 
86. Id. at 2668. 
87. Id. 
88. See id. at 2671 (“The California Supreme Court has 
determined that this purpose is undermined if the very officials the 
initiative process seeks to circumvent are the only parties who can 
defend an enacted initiative when it is challenged in a legal 
proceeding.”). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 2671-72. 
91. Id. at 2672. 
92. Id. at 2667. 
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the balance of power among the three branches of the federal 
government was at the core of Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Windsor: 
 
[T]hose who wrote and ratified our national 
charter . . . knew well the dangers of “primary” 
power, and so created branches of government 
that would be “perfectly coordinate by the terms 
of their common commission,” none of which 
branches could “pretend to an exclusive or 
superior right of settling the boundaries between 
their respective powers.”93 
 
By contrast, Justice Kennedy’s dissent chided the majority for 
“nullifying” the choice of the people of California who, in 
adopting the initiative process, “have exercised their own 
inherent sovereign right to govern themselves.”94 
Although the Hollingsworth opinions do not refer to Erie 
by name, the majority’s and dissent’s disagreement on standing 
can profitably be understood within the framework—in the 
shadow—of Erie. Some commentators have observed that the 
Court frequently employs flexible standing principles to avoid 
wrestling with difficult constitutional issues. 95 This could have 
been the case, beneath the surface, in Hollingsworth, where the 
Court’s standing ruling may have camouflaged a behind-the-
 
93. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2698 (2013) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of 
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 886-90 (1983). 
94. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
95. See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & 
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531 
(“However reassuring it may seem to describe the elements of 
standing in these brief phrases, the [standing] doctrines have 
changed continually. Decisions in recent years seem to have achieved 
a stability in expression, but there are almost unlimited opportunities 
to disagree in applying the Supreme Court’s broad expressions. 
Decades ago, Justice Douglas observed that ‘[g]eneralizations about 
standing to sue are largely worthless as such.’ Many exasperated 
courts and commentators have echoed the thought, often adding that 
standing doctrine is no more than a convenient tool to avoid 
uncomfortable issues or to disguise a surreptitious ruling on the 
merits.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4
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scenes agreement among the majority Justices to avoid ruling 
on the substantive constitutional issue of the validity of 
Proposition 8 with its all-or-nothing implications for the right 
of same-sex marriage nationally.96 Parsing the words used in 
the two opinions to justify their conflicting conclusions on 
standing, this Article purports to analyze the Court’s division 
over the standing issue in terms of the proper judicial balance 
of power in intra-state federalism that lies at the heart of Erie 
jurisprudence. Part III’s theme that Erie jurisprudence is, at its 
core, about weighing competing federal and state interests sets 
the stage for Part IV’s critical assessment of the Court’s 
opinion that, from the perspective of Erie jurisprudence, 
sacrifices California’s sovereign interest in self-government to 
avoid dealing with the merits of the case by applying a 
stringent view of federal standing that trumps California state 
law. 
 
III. “Erie” Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Calibrating the 
Appropriate Balance of Power in Judicial Federalism 
between Federal and State Interests 
 
As Professor Freer observed, “there are competing 
interests in every difficult Erie case”97 which the Court has had 
to balance, and this is equally true in Hollingsworth. Ever 
since the Supreme Court in its Erie opinion interpreted the 
Rules of Decision Act to require federal courts to apply state 
 
96. See Marty Lederman, Understanding Standing: The Court’s 
Article III Questions in the Same-Sex Marriage Cases (I), 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 17, 2013, 11:05 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/01/understanding-standing-the-
courts-article-iii-questions-in-the-same-sex-marriage-cases-i/ (“There 
already has been much speculation, and no doubt there will be much 
more, about whether some or all of the Justices might be motivated to 
find a lack of justiciability in either or both cases in order to avoid a 
holding on the merits—and about whether they would be wise or 
justified in doing so.”) [hereinafter Understanding Standing (I)]. 
Justice Kennedy hinted in his dissent that the Court’s Opinion may 
have been motivated by a desire to avoid confronting a contentious 
issue on the merits: “Of course, the Court must be cautious before 
entering a realm of controversy where the legal community and 
society at large are still formulating ideas and approaches to a most 
difficult subject.” Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2674. 
97. Freer & Arthur, supra note 35, at 77. 
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substantive law in the absence of controlling federal law and, 
subsequently in Hanna v. Plumer, interpreted the Rules 
Enabling Act to require the application of valid and controlling 
federal rules of procedure, federal statutes and federal 
constitutional provisions regardless of outcome difference98, the 
Court has struggled, through a series of decisions, to find the 
appropriate balance in vertical choice of law between state and 
federal interests. As noted by Justice Frankfurter in Guaranty 
Trust v. York, Erie “expressed a policy that touches vitally the 
proper distribution of judicial power between State and federal 
courts[,]”99 an issue that split the Court in Hollingsworth. 
The shifting judicial balance of power manifested by the 
Court’s Erie jurisprudence reflects, in part, the tension between 
formalism and functionalism and the corresponding and 
elusive attempts to distinguish between “substance” and 
“procedure” in determining the deference federal courts owe to 
state law and in determining the limits of the federal 
rulemaking power under the “substantive rights proviso” of the 
Rules Enabling Act.100 Erie doctrine has alternated cyclically 
between formalism and functionalism as the Court has 
attempted to accommodate the tension between formalism’s 
emphasis on predictability and certainty in the application of 
Erie doctrine versus functionalism’s premium on “getting it 
right” in the individual case to achieve the just result.101 The 
shifting nature of Erie doctrine also reflects the Court’s 
attempt, in each case, to calibrate the appropriate judicial 
balance of power between state and federal sovereign interests. 
The challenge of resolving this tension has frequently produced 
five-to-four decisions or an indeterminate set of majority, 
plurality and dissenting opinions.102 This occurred again in the 
 
98. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
99. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
100. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
101. See The Fruits of Shady Grove, supra note 19, at 1007 (“III. 
The Roots of Shady Grove: “Erie” Jurisprudence and the Oscillating 
Pendulum of Judicial Federalism Between Federal and State 
Interests”). 
102. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415 
(1996) (Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer joined. Justice 
Stevens filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which The Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4
  
2014] “STANDING” IN THE SHADOW OF ERIE 657 
Court’s most recent “Erie” offering in Shady Grove and, most 
recently, in Hollingsworth v. Perry, effectively an “Erie” 
decision in all-but-name. 
In 1938, Erie realigned the federal/state judicial balance of 
power in overruling 100 years of precedent under Swift v. 
Tyson by re-interpreting the Rules of Decision Act’s mandate 
that federal courts apply “[t]he laws of the several States” to 
include state substantive case law as well as statutory law.103 
After Erie, federal courts could no longer refuse, in the absence 
of controlling federal constitutional provisions, treaties or 
statutes, to apply the same state substantive law that a state 
court would apply a block away. As observed by one 
commentator, Erie doctrine is, at its core, “about procedural 
federalism.”104 
In Guaranty Trust, decided seven years after Erie, the 
Court rejected a rigid formalist approach to determining 
whether a given state law was “substantive” in favor of a 
functional analysis that gave effect to the core policy 
underlying Erie “that for the same transaction the accident of a 
suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a 
State court a block away, should not lead to a substantially 
different result.”105 Guaranty Trust’s outcome determinative 
test continued to shift the judicial balance of judicial power in 
the direction of respect for state interests by expanding the 
meaning of “substantive” beyond its technical definition to 
include state procedural law that significantly affects the 
enforcement of state substantive rights. Concern by many 
 
joined.); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 
393, 395-96 (2010) (“Justice SCALIA announced the judgment of the 
Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I 
and II-A, an opinion with respect to Parts II-B and II-D, in which 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice THOMAS, and Justice SOTOMAYOR 
join, and an opinion with respect to Part II-C, in which THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE and Justice THOMAS join. . . . Justice Ginsburg filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito 
joined.”). 
103. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938); see 28 U.S.C. § 
1652 (2012). 
104. Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What 
Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 308 (2008). 
105. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 320 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
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commentators that the balance had now shifted too far in the 
state direction was raised by three post-Guaranty Trust 
decisions—Woods, Cohen, and Ragan—in which the Court 
“seemed committed to applying this outcome determinative test 
to its farthest reach” that threatened to neglect the federal 
judicial system’s interest in the uniform application of federal 
procedural rules promulgated under the authority of the Rules 
Enabling Act.106 
These three decisions transformed Guaranty Trust’s 
functionalist approach into a formalist one that asks: Is the 
choice of competing rules as viewed by the court post-hoc 
outcome determinative? The answer literally will be yes in 
almost every case. Therefore, the federal rule must almost 
always yield to state law. As noted by Professor John Hart Ely: 
 
[I]t would seem that any rule can be said to have 
both “procedural effects,” affecting the way in 
which litigation is conducted, and “substantive 
effects,” affecting society’s distribution of risks 
and rewards. Thus, an “effects test” would seem 
destined either to unintelligibility or to the 
invalidation of every Federal Rule, thereby 
rendering the Enabling Act entirely self-
defeating.107 
 
In an effort to restore equilibrium to the balance between 
federal and state interests, and in reaction to the perceived 
threat to “the integrity and independence of the federal 
courts[,]”108 the Court explicitly adopted an interest-balancing 
approach in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative, Inc.109 As 
Professor Freer comments, “[b]y recognizing three interests—
(1) some federal systemic interest, (2) the state interest in 
 
106. See 19 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, at § 4508 
(“In the wake of these three 1949 decisions many observers believed 
that there was no longer much, if any, room for independent 
regulation of procedure.”). 
107. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. 
REV. 693, 724 n.170 (1974) (citation omitted). 
108. Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After 
Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1647 (1998). 
109. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
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governing the primary activity of citizens, and (3) the litigant 
interest in uniformity of outcome—and by embracing the 
concept of balancing, the Court reinvigorated principles of 
federalism in the vertical choice of law equation.”110 In 
evaluating the state’s interest, Byrd identified a type of state 
procedural law that is sufficiently “bound up with [state-
created] rights and obligations in such a way that its 
application in the federal court is required.”111 This concept of 
“bound up” state procedure reappeared most recently in Justice 
Stevens’ plurality opinion in Shady Grove112 and, effectively, in 
Justice Kennedy’s Hollingsworth dissent. Justice Kennedy 
views the authority to assert the State’s interest in defending 
challenged initiatives, granted by California law to official 
initiative proponents, as essential to the integrity of 
California’s initiative process. As written elsewhere, this 
interest-balancing approach to conflicting federal/state 
interests also sheds light on the Court’s multiple opinions in 
Shady Grove as it does in Hollingsworth.113 Byrd’s interest-
balancing approach, in Professor Freer’s and Professor Arthur’s 
view, “actually explains the results in cases in which the Court 
did not cite it.”114 
In 1965, the Erie pendulum moved even further toward the 
federal interest115 in horizontal procedural uniformity at the 
 
110. Freer, supra note 108, at 1651 (footnotes omitted). 
111. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535 (emphasis added). 
112. See infra text accompanying notes 157-61. In his plurality 
opinion, Justice Stevens inquired whether an exception to New York’s 
state’s class action rule stating that an action to recover a statutory 
penalty may not be maintained as class action was “so intertwined 
with a state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the 
state-created right.” Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 559 U.S. 393, 423 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
113. The Fruits of Shady Grove, supra note 19, at 1006 (“In 
calibrating the judicial balance of power between federal and state 
interests, the Court’s majority [in Shady Grove] reaffirmed . . . the 
vitality of the [Rules Enabling Act’s] policy of federal procedural 
uniformity in diversity actions, by holding that Rule 23 . . . controlled 
the issue in dispute, was valid, and, therefore, preempted New York’s 
conflicting, and outcome determinative, class action rule.”). 
114. See Freer & Arthur, supra note 35, at 62. 
115. See Ely, supra note 107, at 696 (“The Court [after Byrd] 
could not leave such sensible moderation alone, however, and in 1965, 
the pendulum that had begun in Byrd to swing back toward the 
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expense of vertical substantive-outcome uniformity.116 Hanna 
purported to insulate Federal Rules, and by implication other 
federal directives, that are on point from Erie analysis by 
holding that they must be applied by federal courts over 
conflicting and outcome determinative state law.117 However, 
because only federal directives that are broad enough to control 
the issue in dispute can preempt conflicting state law, Hanna’s 
seemingly inflexible, formalist rule leaves room for respecting 
integrally bound up state procedural law by narrowly 
construing the scope of the federal law in question.118 Hence, 
even after Hanna, the Court still engages in the Byrd-style 
exercise of balancing federal and state interests by choosing to 
interpret arguably applicable federal directives broadly or 
narrowly and did so, implicitly, in Hollingsworth. 
As expressed by Professors Freer and Arthur: 
 
The starting point in vertical choice of law 
analysis is whether a federal directive applies. 
 
teaching of Erie swung too far, indeed perhaps beyond its 1938 
starting place, in Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court in 
Hanna v. Plumer.”). 
116. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965) ("‘One of 
the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules is to bring about 
uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules. This 
is especially true of matters which relate to the administration of 
legal proceedings, an area in which federal courts have traditionally 
exerted strong inherent power, completely aside from the powers 
Congress expressly conferred in the Rules.’”). 
117. See id. at 473-74 (“To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of 
enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the 
Constitution's grant of power over federal procedure or Congress' 
attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act. Rule 4(d)(1) is 
valid, and controls the instant case.”). 
118. Hanna itself recognizes that Erie applies if the federal rule is 
not broad enough to control the issue in dispute. Id. at 470 (“The Erie 
rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule. It is true that 
there have been cases where this Court has held applicable a state 
rule in the face of an argument that the situation was governed by 
one of the Federal Rules. But the holding of each such case was not 
that Erie commanded displacement of a Federal Rule by an 
inconsistent state rule, but rather that the scope of the Federal Rule 
was not as broad as the losing party urged, and therefore, there being 
no Federal Rule which covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded 
the enforcement of state law.”). 
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The decision on this point determines which 
regime—pro-federal or pro-state—will apply. . . . 
Through the years, the Court has been anything 
but consistent in its approach to the important 
funneling function of assessing the breadth of a 
Federal Rule.119 
 
By interpreting the scope of a federal directive narrowly to 
avoid conflict with state law that is integrally bound up with 
the enforcement of substantive state rights or broadly to 
preempt state law, the Court has, in some cases, deferred to 
state substantive policy.120 In other cases, the Court has 
favored federal interests over competing state interests by 
broadly construing federal law, in formalist, plain-meaning-of-
the-text fashion, to govern the issue in dispute.121 The Court’s 
opinion in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. exemplifies the 
formalist approach where the Court asserted: “The Federal 
Rules should be given their plain meaning. If a direct collision 
 
119. Freer & Arthur, supra note 35, at 70. Also see Kevin M. 
Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 987, 1001 (2011) (responding to “those scholars who hold that 
Byrd is not central to the unguided Erie choice”: “First, Hanna did 
not say it was overruling Byrd, and instead cited it twice for support. 
Second, the passage of Hanna most inconsistent with the Byrd 
holding lies in a footnote to dicta. Third, the focus of those dicta was 
to straighten out an error of the old outcome-determinative test, not 
to inter Erie’s greater concern with meshing state and federal 
interests. Fourth, subsequent lower court cases continued regularly to 
cite Byrd, often in a way essential to their results. Fifth, the Supreme 
Court in Gasperini applied Byrd to reach its result that the federal 
government’s interests in controlling its courts’ standard of appellate 
review outweighed News York’s substantive interests. It resurrected 
Byrd’s term of ‘essential characteristics’ of the federal system, which 
means nothing more than an affirmative countervailing consideration 
of sufficient weight to overcome the interests in favor of applying 
state law.”) 
120. See id. (“At least six times, the Court has found that a 
Federal Rule did not apply—in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan 
Corp., Palmer, Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 
Walker, Semtek International v. Lockheed Martin Corp., and 
Gasperini.”). 
121. See id. (“In four cases before Shady Grove, the Court found 
that a Federal Rule was on point—in Sibbach v. Wilson, Mississippi 
Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, Burlington Northern Railroad v. 
Woods, and Hanna.”). 
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with state law arises from that plain meaning, then the 
analysis developed in Hanna v. Plumer applies.” 122 The Court’s 
opinion in Gasperini illustrates the functionalist approach to 
accommodate both federal and state interests in the same 
decision,123 giving rise to speculation by one commentator that 
the Court “may have replaced the [formalist] search for ‘plain 
meaning’ with a heightened sensitivity to potential impact on 
state policy.”124 
In Gasperini, the Erie pendulum reversed course once 
again, swinging in the direction of accommodating state 
interests by narrowly construing a Federal Rule of Procedure to 
avoid a collision with a state procedural rule. The plaintiff in 
Gasperini won a $450,000 jury verdict in a diversity suit.125 
The defendant moved, under Federal Rule 59, for a new trial on 
the grounds that the damage award was excessive.126 Rule 
59(a)(1)(A) provides that “[t]he court may . . . grant a new trial . 
. . for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been 
granted in an action at law in federal court[.]”127 Traditionally, 
one of those reasons is verdict-excessiveness, but Rule 59 does 
not specify the applicable standard for determining whether 
the jury’s damage award is excessive. In scrutinizing jury 
awards, federal trial judges have ordered new trials on grounds 
of excessive damages only when the verdict is so unreasonable 
that it “shock[s] the conscience[.]”128 New York’s CPLR § 
5501(c), a tort-reform measure in procedural garb designed to 
curb runaway jury awards, gave New York’s appellate courts 
 
122. See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 
(1980) (“The Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning. If a 
direct collision with state law arises from that plain meaning, then 
the analysis developed in Hanna v. Plumer applies.”). 
123. See 19 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, at § 4511 
(Supp. 2013) (“[T]he Court’s decision in Gasperini is a reasonable 
attempt to perform the balancing of interests required by Byrd.”). 
124. Freer, supra note 108, at 1643. 
125. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 420 
(1996). 
126. Id. at 420, 422 (“Before 1986, state and federal courts in New 
York generally invoked the same judge-made formulation in 
responding to excessiveness attacks on jury verdicts: courts would not 
disturb an award unless the amount was so exorbitant that it 
‘shocked the conscience of the court.’”). 
127. FED. R. CIV. P. 59. 
128. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 422 (emphasis added). 
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greater authority to scrutinize jury awards by permitting a new 
trial if an award “deviates materially from what would be 
reasonable compensation.”129 On appeal to the Supreme Court, 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, framed the following 
Erie-Hanna issue: “This case presents an important question 
regarding the standard a federal court uses to measure the 
alleged excessiveness of a jury’s verdict in an action for 
damages based on state law.”130 
Justice Ginsburg gave scant attention to the threshold 
question under Hanna whether Rule 59 was broad enough to 
control the standard for determining excessiveness, addressing 
the issue indirectly in a footnote directed at Justice Scalia’s 
dissent. She noted, “Justice Scalia finds in Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59 a ‘federal standard’ for new trial motions in 
‘direct collision’ with, and ‘leaving no room for the operation of,’ 
a state law like CPLR § 5501.”131 While acknowledging that it 
is “indeed ‘Hornbook’ law that a most usual ground for a Rule 
59 motion is that ‘the damages are excessive[,]’”132 Justice 
Ginsburg’s footnote continued: “Whether damages are 
excessive for the claim-in-suit must be governed by some law. 
And there is no candidate for that governance other than the 
law that gives rise to the claim for relief—here, the law of New 
York.”133 In justifying this narrow interpretation of Rule 59, 
Justice Ginsburg noted that “[f]ederal courts have interpreted 
the Federal Rules . . . with sensitivity to important state 
interests and regulatory policies.”134 She will, again, in her 
dissenting opinion in Shady Grove—and to a more limited 
extent, Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion in that case—
urge this same restraint in interpreting federal law to 
accommodate state law. However, seventeen years later, in 
Hollingsworth, Justice Ginsburg cast her vote with the 
majority of Justices who declined to interpret federal standing 
doctrine under Article III “with sensitivity” to the interests of 
 
129. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 2011) (emphasis added). 
130. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 422. 
131. Id. at 437 n.22 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Burlington N. 
R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987)). 
132. Id. (citations omitted). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 427 n.7. 
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California in the integrity of the State’s hallowed initiative 
process. Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Hollingsworth argued 
that federal standing doctrine does not control the threshold 
issue whether official initiative proponents are authorized to 
assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s validity. 
This Article argues in Part IV that Hollingsworth, viewed 
from an Erie perspective, is similar to Gasperini because, in 
both cases, the textual sources of the applicable legal principles 
did not expressly address the issues-in-dispute and, therefore, 
did not lend themselves to an inflexible, formalist approach. In 
such cases, where federal decisional law—rather than literal 
text—provides the applicable legal principles, Gasperini 
provides credible support for employing a Byrd-style analysis 
to critically evaluate the Court’s opinions in Hollingsworth. As 
observed by Professor Freer: “Gasperini shows that Byrd 
survives Hanna and serves at least to identify federal systemic 
interests.”135 Professor Rowe, commenting on Gasperini’s 
influence on Erie-Hanna doctrine, noted a limited role for 
Byrd-balancing methodology in decisional rule cases where “an 
‘essential characteristic’ of the federal judicial system 
presenting a ‘countervailing federal interest’ is involved.”136 
In Gasperini, the majority implicitly rejected Justice 
Scalia’s dissenting view that the disruption of the judge-jury 
relationship in federal court, that would be caused by 
“changing the standard by which trial judges review jury 
 
135. Freer, supra note 108, at 1660 (“[Gasperini] is frustratingly 
mum, though, about Byrd’s future in any larger sense . . . . But, 
reading between the lines of Gasperini, we can find that Byrd—writ 
large—may have a strong future.”). 
136. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does 
Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court is Doing a Halfway Decent Job 
in its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 1014 
(1998) (“[T]he Hanna ‘twin aims’ approach remains applicable to such 
decisional-rule cases – unless an ‘essential characteristic’ of the 
federal judicial system presenting a ‘countervailing federal interest’ is 
involved. In such cases Byrd and Gasperini call for a broadening 
beyond the ‘twin aims’ version of ‘outcome determination’ analysis to 
include consideration of the nature and weight of the state’s interest 
in application of its own rule in federal court, with particular focus on 
whether it is ‘bound up with’ clearly substantive state-law rights and 
an eye to whether the state or federal interest should prevail or if the 
two can be accommodated.”). 
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verdicts,” 137 qualified as an “essential characteristic” of the 
federal trial courts that would trigger Byrd’s interest-balancing 
analysis. In Hollingsworth, the overriding essential 
characteristic was the federal judiciary’s limited Article III role 
among the three branches of the federal government. Both 
Gasperini and Hollingsworth involved an “essential 
characteristic” of the federal judicial system presenting a 
“countervailing federal interest” in which decisional law gives 
content to vaguely worded text.138 In Gasperini, federal 
decisional law—not the literal text of Federal Rule 59—
provides the precedent for the shocks the conscience standard. 
In Hollingsworth, federal decisional law—not the literal text of 
Article III—provides the governing law on federal standing.139 
Both cases involve a state rule integrally bound up with state 
substantive rights. In Gasperini, CPLR § 5501(c) was a 
procedural mechanism, in Professor Rowe’s words, “to control 
something that is very much a matter of state substantive law, 
the amounts of compensatory damages recoverable on state-
law claims . . . .”140 In Hollingsworth, state decisional law 
authorizing initiative proponents to assert the State’s interest 
in the initiative’s validity is bound up with the integrity of the 
State’s initiative process. 
Professor Rowe cautions that the omission of an explicit 
reference to Byrd in that part of the Gasperini Court’s opinion 
 
137. “But the scope of the Court's concern is oddly circumscribed. 
The ‘essential characteristic’ of the federal jury, and, more 
specifically, the role of the federal trial court in reviewing jury 
judgments, apparently counts for little. The Court approves the 
‘accommodation’ achieved by having district courts review jury 
verdicts under the ‘deviates materially’ standard, because it regards 
that as a means of giving effect to the State's purposes ‘without 
disrupting the federal system,’ ante, at 437. But changing the 
standard by which trial judges review jury verdicts does disrupt the 
federal system, and is plainly inconsistent with the ‘strong federal 
policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury 
relationship in the federal court.’ Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. 
Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538, 2 L. Ed. 2d 953, 78 S. Ct. 893 
(1958). “The Court's opinion does not even acknowledge, let alone 
address, this dislocation.” 515 U.S. at 462 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
138. See id.; Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); 
Gasperini, 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
139. See supra text accompanying notes 77-85. 
140. Rowe, supra note 136, at 998. 
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that addressed the applicable standard of review for verdict 
excessiveness indicates “the seeming limit on the scope of 
Byrd’s applicability”141 and that “Byrd plays no role in the 
choice of standard for verdict-excessiveness.”142 He concludes 
that this omission sends “the message still surprisingly often 
ignored that the place to start in a federal decisional-law case 
is with the Hanna ‘twin aims’ formulation, and not with Byrd’s 
balancing approach.”143 While it is true that “Erie” analysis 
does not start with Byrd, neither does it necessarily stop with 
the Hanna “twin aims” version of the outcome determinative 
test.144 It is plausible to conclude that the Gasperini majority 
did not explicitly mention Byrd because—having by implication 
determined that that the disruption of the judge-jury 
relationship was not sufficiently compelling to constitute an 
overriding essential characteristic of the federal judicial 
 
141. Id. at 999. 
142. Id. at 1008. 
143. Id. at 1000. 
144. On the continuing relevance of Byrd in “Erie” analysis post-
Gasperini, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 341-42 (6th 
ed. 2012) (emphasis added): 
 
If there is no conflict between state and federal law, 
both are to be applied. But if state and federal law are 
inconsistent, the following questions must be asked: 
First, is there a valid federal statute or federal rule of 
procedure on point, such as a provision of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of 
Appellate procedure? If so, then the federal law is to 
be applied, even if there is conflicting state law. If 
there is no valid statute or rule of procedure, the 
second question is whether the application of the state 
law in question is likely to determine the outcome of 
the lawsuit. If the state law is not outcome 
determinative, then federal law is used. But if the 
state law is deemed to be outcome determinative, then 
the third question is asked: Is there an overriding 
federal interest justifying the application of federal 
law? If state law is outcome determinative and there is 
no countervailing federal interest, then state law 
controls. Otherwise, federal law is applied. In applying 
this test, federal courts are to be guided by the goals 
of the Erie doctrine, which are to prevent forum 
shopping and the inequitable administration of 
justice. 
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system145—it did not have to engage in a Byrd-balancing 
analysis. This conclusion is bolstered by the Court’s explicit 
invocation of Byrd in that aspect of its opinion dealing with the 
allocation of authority between federal trial and appellate 
courts in applying the excessiveness standard where the 
majority held that the Second Circuit erred in applying the 
New York’s statute’s de novo standard of appellate review 
instead of the federal abuse of discretion standard: “[T]he 
Second Circuit did not attend to ‘an essential characteristic of 
[the federal-court] system,’ (cite omitted) when it used § 5501(c) 
as ‘the standard for [federal] appellate review’ (cite omitted).”146 
Fourteen years after Gasperini, the balance of federal/state 
interests shifted back toward the federal judiciary’s interest in 
regulating procedure. This occurred when a five-Justice 
majority ruled in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate 
Insurance Co.,147 that the federal class action rule preempted a 
conflicting New York state class action rule that would have 
barred the state law claim-in-suit from being maintained as a 
class action in New York state court. The Court fractured into 
essentially three different views about the proper approach to 
balancing state and federal interests in resolving vertical 
 
145. Rowe, supra note 136 at 999, note 150 (“The Gasperini Court 
speaks early in part III.B of its opinion, once it has resolved the 
choice of standard in favor of the state rule and moved on to the trial-
appeal allocation of responsibility for the standard's application, of 
Byrd's having said that the "'outcome-determination' test was an 
insufficient guide in cases presenting countervailing federal 
interests." Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2222. The implication seems 
strong that the Court saw no federal interest sufficient to invoke Byrd 
in the content of the standard itself in this case, as opposed to the 
allocation of responsibility for its application within the federal 
judicial structure.”); Wendy Collins Perdue, The Sources and Scope of 
Federal Procedural Common Law: Some Reflections on Erie and 
Gasperini, 46 Kan. L. Rev. 751, 771 (1998) (commenting on 
Gasperini’s impact on Byrd: “[W]ith respect to the district court’s 
standard for reviewing verdicts, the Court gave no consideration to 
whether there were countervailing federal interests. One could argue 
that a lower standard for new trials may increase the number of 
trials in federal court and impose significant burdens. This may not 
be a sufficiently large or likely federal interest, but it would have 
been helpful for the Court to so state.”). 
146. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431. 
147. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
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choice of law issues.148 Professors Freer and Arthur 
commented, “[e]ach of the three opinions in Shady Grove 
reflects [Byrd’s] influence, if not its command.”149 
The majority and dissenting Justices disagreed about 
whether the federal class action rule was broad enough in 
scope to govern the issue-in-dispute. The majority broadly 
construed Federal Rule 23 by applying a formalist, plain-text 
approach to the vertical choice of law issue, an approach 
dictated by the plain-text, literal wording of the two competing 
class action rules which both literally addressed the same 
issue—whether Shady Grove was authorized to “maintain” a 
class action. The federal rule thereby preempted the conflicting 
state procedure, transforming, in the words of Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion, “a $500 case into a $5,000,000 
award, although the State creating the right to recover has 
proscribed this alchemy.”150 The Court effectively decided that 
the federal interest, reflected in the Rules Enabling Act, in 
prescribing a uniform procedural framework for civil litigation 
across all federal district courts, outweighed what Justice 
Ginsburg explained in her dissenting opinion as “New York’s 
legitimate interest in keeping certain monetary awards 
reasonably bounded”151 by barring the use of the class action 
device to recover a statutory penalty created by state law. 
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion articulated a rigidly formalist, 
textual approach, applying the literal words of both class action 
rules that left no room for an inquiry into the legislature’s 
intent in enacting the state class action rule. Justice Stevens, 
who agreed with the plurality that the two class action rules 
were literally in conflict, adopted a more flexible version of 
plain-text statutory analysis in resolving vertical choice of law 
issues that would leave some room for applying “bound up” 
state procedure. 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, joined by three other Justices, 
advocated a functionalist approach—reminiscent of Guaranty 
Trust’s outcome determinative test—”to interpret Federal 
 
148. See The Fruits of Shady Grove, supra note 19. 
149. Freer & Arthur, supra note 35, at 62. 
150. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 436 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). 
151. Id. at 437. 
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Rules with awareness of, and sensitivity to, important state 
regulatory policies.”152 The dissent characterized the policy 
behind New York’s class action rule as essentially substantive 
in nature which should be accommodated by narrowly 
construing Federal Rule 23 to avoid a conflict with New York’s 
class action rule.153 Just as Justice Kennedy’s dissent, three 
years later in Hollingsworth, will support the Ninth Circuit’s 
narrow interpretation of the scope of Article III’s standing 
jurisprudence by framing the authority of the initiative 
proponents to assert the State’s interest in Proposition 8’s 
validity as a threshold question to be resolved by applying 
California state law, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Shady Grove 
agreed with the Second Circuit’s view that New York’s class 
action rule addressed (in Justice Scalia’s words characterizing 
the position of the dissent) “an antecedent question”: 
 
Rule 23 . . . concerns only the criteria for 
determining whether a given class can and 
should be certified; section 901(b) [of New York’s 
class action rule], on the other hand, addresses 
an antecedent question: whether the particular 
type of claim is eligible for class treatment in the 
first place—a question on which Rule 23 is 
silent.154 
 
Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion in Shady Grove opted 
for a “plain textual meaning” approach to the interpretation of 
state statutes less rigid than that embraced by Justice Scalia’s 
plurality opinion, leaving some room for applying bound-up 
state rules. In Justice Stevens’ interpretation of the Rules 
Enabling Act’s substantive rights proviso, “[i]n order to 
displace a federal rule, there must be more than just a 
 
152. Id. 
153. See id. at 449 (“The absence of an inevitable collision 
between Rule 23 and § 901(b) becomes evident once it is comprehended 
that a federal court sitting in diversity can accord due respect to both 
state and federal prescriptions.”); see also id. at 451 (“By finding a 
conflict without considering whether Rule 23 rationally should be read 
to avoid any collision, the Court unwisely and unnecessarily retreats 
from the federalism principles undergirding Erie.”). 
154. Id. at 399 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
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possibility that the state rule is different than it appears.”155 To 
overcome the use of a state statute’s “plain text[]” as a default 
tool of interpretation, Justice Stevens would require that 
legislative history clearly show the legislature’s intent to use 
procedure to change the substantive law of the State, 
something akin to Byrd’s characterization of state procedure 
that is integrally bound up with the enforcement of state 
substantive rights.156 Rejecting the dissent’s advocacy of the 
very functionalist “outcome determinative test,” Justice 
Stevens adopted a more modified functionalist standard that 
“distinguish[es] between procedural rules adopted for some 
policy reason and seemingly procedural rules that are 
intimately bound up in the scope of a substantive right or 
remedy.”157 In deciding whether New York’s competing class 
action rule was “substantive,” such that Federal Rule 23 could 
not validly preempt the state rule, he inquired, in Byrd’s 
terminology, whether the state rule is “so intertwined with a 
state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the 
state-created right”158 and found that it was not.159 Professors 
Freer and Arthur have commented that Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissenting opinion also applies Byrd’s “bound up” approach in 
her “functional analysis of the New York statute”160 increasing 
to five the Justices in Shady Grove “willing to engage in the 
‘bound up’ analysis suggested by Byrd.”161 
As discussed in Part IV, the Hollingsworth Court’s 
majority and dissenting opinions reflect this interest-balancing 
approach to the vertical choice of law issue in dispute. The 
majority broadly construed the scope of federal standing 
jurisprudence to govern the authority of the initiative 
 
155. Id. at 436 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 433 (emphasis added). 
158. Id. at 423. 
159. See id. at 436 (“But given that there are two plausible 
competing narratives, it seems obvious to me that we should respect 
the plain textual reading of § 901(b), a rule in New York's procedural 
code about when to certify class actions brought under any source of 
law, and respect Congress' decision that Rule 23 governs class 
certification in federal courts.”). 
160. Freer & Arthur, supra note 35, at 75. 
161. Id. at 76. 
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proponents to assert the State’s interest in Proposition 8’s 
validity. By contrast, the dissent narrowly construed standing 
doctrine to avoid a conflict with California state law to 
accommodate the state interest in the integrity of California’s 
initiative process by characterizing the issue of the proponent’s 
authority as a threshold question governed by state law. 
Though Erie is not mentioned in either the majority or 
dissenting opinions, the divergent views on the standing issue 
reflect, at bottom, a difference over the “proper balance of the 
core Erie interests.”162 
 
IV. A Critical Assessment of the Federal-State Balance of 
Interests in Hollingsworth v. Perry 
 
As discussed in Part III, the decision whether to narrowly 
or broadly construe the scope of a federal rule, statute, or 
constitutional provision is often determined by how the Court 
balances state interests against federal interests. If the Court 
decides that state interests weigh more heavily, then it will 
narrowly construe the federal directive in order to give effect to 
the state law. If federal interests are deemed to outweigh state 
interests and outcome difference, the Court will broadly 
construe the federal directive. What follows is a critical 
analysis of Hollingsworth’s majority and dissenting opinions in 
light of the Byrd-balancing factors: (1) the federal systemic 
interest, (2) the state interest in governing the primary activity 
of citizens, and (3) the litigant interest in uniformity of 
outcome.163 
The split between the majority and dissenting Justices in 
Hollingsworth can be interpreted, from an Erie perspective, as 
a difference of opinion over the proper balance between 
California’s state interest in conferring authority on 
Proposition 8’s initiative proponents to defend that initiative 
when state officials refused to do so, and the federal interest in 
confining the exercise of the federal judicial power within the 
constitutional limits imposed by Article III’s case-or-
controversy provision. In effect, and without saying so 
 
162. Id. at 78. 
163. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
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explicitly, the Justices implicitly engaged in a Byrd-style 
weighing of federal and state interests as it did in the Court’s 
most recent Erie decisions in Gasperini and Shady Grove. 
Viewed in this light, Hollingsworth is the latest in a tortuous 
line of Supreme Court decisions often referred to as Erie’s 
progeny. 
No one disputes that federal standing under Article III 
requires “the litigant to prove that he has suffered a concrete 
and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the 
challenged conduct”164 or that the State of California suffered a 
particularized injury when the district court declared 
Proposition 8 unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its 
enforcement.165 Because “[t]he exclusive basis of [the Ninth 
Circuit’s] holding that Proponents possess Article III standing 
is their authority to assert the interests of the State of 
California, rather than any authority they might have to assert 
particularized interests of their own,”166 the federal standing 
issue before the U.S Supreme Court focused exclusively on 
whether the proponents were qualified to assert the State’s 
particularized interest. Therefore, the Erie issue that divided 
the Justices in Hollingsworth essentially turned on whether 
the federal courts should be free to second-guess, and 
consequently to override, the judgment of a state’s highest 
court about the qualifications of the initiative’s proponents to 
represent the state’s interest in federal court. This issue, in 
turn, homed in on whether the proponents would be advocating 
the state’s particularized interest or their own generalized 
grievance. Framing the issue in terms of the judicial balance of 
power in our federal system, does the federal judiciary or 
California’s judiciary get to decide whether initiative 
proponents are qualified to assert a state’s particularized 
interest in defending an initiative’s validity in federal court? 
The majority ruled that Article III standing precedent 
 
164. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) 
(emphasis added). 
165. See id. at 2664 (“No one doubts that a State has a cognizable 
interest ‘in the continued enforceability’ of its laws that is harmed by 
a judicial decision declaring a state law unconstitutional.”). 
166. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1074 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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controls this issue, not California law as interpreted by the 
state’s high court, and that federal standing jurisprudence 
imposes a formal “agency” requirement on a proponent’s 
authority to represent the State’s interest in federal court. 
Noting that “[n]either the California Supreme Court nor the 
Ninth Circuit ever described the proponents as agents of the 
State, and [that] they plainly do not qualify as such,” the Court 
held they did not have Article III standing. Without a formal 
agency relationship that assured the proponents’ 
accountability, as fiduciaries, to the State, the Court feared 
that the proponents’ interests were unhinged from the State’s, 
freeing them to assert their own generalized ideological 
views.167 The majority also seems to have minimized the harm 
to the State’s interest in defending Proposition 8, having been 
made aware of the “variety of ways for a state to guarantee a 
defense of its initiatives” described in Walter Dellinger’s 
amicus brief in support of Respondents on the standing 
issue.168 This expansive interpretation of Article III standing 
doctrine to reach what the Ninth Circuit called a “question[] 
 
167. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666-67 (“[T]he most basic 
features of an agency relationship are missing here. . . . [P]etitioners 
answer to no one; they decide for themselves, with no review, what 
arguments to make and how to make them. Unlike California’s 
attorney general, they are not elected at regular intervals—or elected 
at all. No provision provides for their removal. As one amicus 
explains, ‘the proponents apparently have an unelected appointment 
for an unspecified period of time as defenders of the initiative, 
however, and to whatever extent they choose to defend it.’ . . . They 
are free to pursue a purely ideological commitment to the law’s 
constitutionality without the need to take cognizance of resource 
constraints, changes in public opinion, or potential ramifications for 
other state priorities.”). 
168. Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents on the Issue of Standing, supra note 33, at 30; see also 
Marty Lederman, Revisiting the Court’s Several Options in the 
California Marriage Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 29, 2013, 4:54 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/revisiting-the-courts-several-
options-in-the-california-marriage-case/ (“As Justice Breyer noted . . . 
the Dellinger brief describes several ways in which California law 
could be amended to prevent [executive officials in California to 
effectively thwart the initiative process], including by providing for an 
independent counsel who would be required to act as a fiduciary of 
the state with the responsibility of defending initiatives when the 
Attorney General declines to do so.”). 
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antecedent to determining federal standing”169 was driven—at 
least on the surface—by the majority’s overriding concern with 
protecting “vital [federal] interests going to the role of the 
Judiciary in our system of separated powers.”170 To protect 
these vital federal interests, the Court placed Article III limits 
on the power of state law to, in Professor Lederman’s words, 
“expand the category of persons entitled to represent the state’s 
interests in federal court.”171 “And no matter its reasons,” the 
Court’s Opinion affirmed, “the fact that a State thinks a 
private party should have standing to seek relief for a 
generalized grievance cannot override our settled law to the 
contrary.”172 
Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion offered a contrasting 
balance-of-power assessment, arguing that the State’s 
overriding interest in preserving “the integrity of its initiative 
process[]”173 requires that California state law, not federal 
standing doctrine, control the issue of the proponents’ 
qualifications to represent the State’s interest in federal court: 
 
[T]he Court today concludes that this state-
defined status and this state-conferred right fall 
short of meeting federal requirements because 
the proponents cannot point to a formal 
delegation of authority that tracks the 
requirements of the Restatement of Agency. But 
the State Supreme Court’s definition of 
proponents’ powers is binding on this Court. And 
that definition is fully sufficient to establish the 
standing and adversity that are requisites for 
justiciability under Article III of the United 
States Constitution.174 
 
Addressing the qualifications of the initiative proponents to 
represent the State’s interest, Justice Kennedy converted what 
 
169. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1074. 
170. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667. 
171. See Understanding Standing (VI), supra note 58. 
172. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667. 
173. Id. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
174. Id. at 2668. 
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the majority viewed as “deficiencies in the proponents’ 
connection to the State government . . . “— that proponents 
who are not formally appointed as agents of the State would 
represent their own generalized interest—into “essential 
qualifications to defend the initiative system[]” since “[t]he very 
object of the initiative system is to establish a lawmaking 
process that does not depend upon state officials.”175 He also 
challenged the relevance of the Restatement’s concept of a 
formal agency relationship to “an agent representing a 
principal composed of nearly 40 million residents of a State.”176 
 Did the Court “get it right” from the Erie perspective of 
calibrating the appropriate judicial balance of power in vertical 
federalism? A critical analysis of the Court’s Opinion in light of 
Erie jurisprudence, summarized in Part III, indicates that the 
Court’s majority overstated the harm to the federal interest—
maintaining the separation of powers structure of the federal 
government—that would accrue from conferring federal 
standing on the proponents, and understated the impairment 
of California’s interest—maintaining the integrity of the 
People’s initiative power as an integral part of the State’s 
governmental structure—that was caused by the Court’s denial 
of standing. Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion makes a 
compelling case for privileging California’s interest in the 
integrity of its initiative process over competing federal 
interests. Each state has a sovereign interest within the federal 
system in determining its own governmental structure. 
Whatever its shortcomings, the initiative process in California 
is sacrosanct, accurately described by Justice Kennedy as “one 
of the cornerstones of the State’s governmental structure.”177 
 As noted by the Ninth Circuit panel, the question of the 
proponents’ authority to defend the validity of Proposition 8 is 
integral to the balance of power within California’s 
governmental organization under the State’s Constitution.178 
 
175. Id. at 2670. 
176. Id. at 2671. 
177. Id. 
178. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 
2011) (“Rather than rely on our own understanding of this balance of 
power under the California Constitution, however, we certify the 
question so that the Court may provide an authoritative answer as to 
the rights, interests, and authority under California law of the official 
45
  
676 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
The California Supreme Court determined that the power of 
the People to “to alter or reform” the structure of state 
government, set forth in Article II, section 1 of the California 
Constitution, “reflects a basic precept of [California’s] 
governmental system[.]”179 The Court observed that the 
initiative power is rooted in that basic precept180 and affirmed 
that “[t]he primary purpose of the initiative was to afford the 
people the ability to propose and to adopt constitutional 
amendments or statutory provisions that their elected public 
officials had refused or declined to adopt.”181 
For good or ill, California’s initiative power is an integral 
part of the State’s governmental structure that provides, 
through direct democracy, a counterweight to the power of 
elected officials. The official proponents’ authority under 
California law to defend an initiative when state officials refuse 
to do so is, in Byrd’s terminology, “bound up”182 with the 
integrity of that process. As Justice Kennedy observed, “[t]he 
very object of the initiative system is to establish a lawmaking 
process that does not depend upon state officials.”183 The 
California Supreme Court determined that “this purpose is 
undermined if the very officials the initiative process seeks to 
 
proponents of an initiative measure to defend its validity upon its 
enactment in the case of a challenge to its constitutionality, where 
the state officials charged with that duty refuse to execute it.”). 
179. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1016 (Cal. 2011). 
180. See id. (“Although California’s original 1849 Constitution 
declared that ‘[a]ll political power is inherent in the people,’ it was not 
until 60 years later—in 1911—that the California Constitution was 
amended to afford the voters of California the authority to directly 
propose and adopt state constitutional amendments and statutory 
provisions through the initial power.”). 
181. Id. 
182. See Katz, supra note 7, at 1332 (recognizing the “bound-up” 
connection between standing-related issues and the enforcement of 
substantive rights was recognized in the reverse-Erie context: “The 
fact that Congress may neglect to assign standing limits to its 
legislation does not imply that these limits are not ‘bound up’ in the 
federal right. In the Erie and reverse-Erie contexts, the Court 
determines if a certain rule should always accompany a substantive 
right by asking whether the rule is integral to the substantive right 
or merely incidental to the forum which normally adjudicates the 
right.”). 
183. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2670 (2013) 
(Kennedy, J. dissenting). 
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circumvent are the only parties who can defend an enacted 
initiative when it is challenged in a legal proceeding.”184 In 
light of the independent nature of the people’s initiative power 
that allows voters to bypass the legislative and executive 
branches, these enforcement mechanisms should not be 
dependent on action by state officials whose potential “residual 
hostility or indifference” to the initiative might “prevent a full 
and robust defense of the measure” in court.185 Byrd teaches 
that “bound up” state procedure—here, the proponents’ 
authority to assert the State’s substantive interest—should be 
applied by federal courts. Justice Kennedy affirmed that the 
California Supreme Court is best qualified to judge how best to 
defend that interest: “And if the Court’s concern is that the 
proponents are unaccountable, that fear is neither well founded 
nor sufficient to overcome the contrary judgment of the State 
Supreme Court.”186 
Addressing the majority’s requirement that only textual 
delegation of authority consistent with the Restatement will 
suffice to confer federal standing, the dissent—correctly, in my 
view—responds that it is “not for [the U.S. Supreme Court] to 
say that a State must determine the substance and meaning of 
its laws by statute, or by judicial decision, or by a combination 
of the two. That, too, is for the State to decide.”187 
The Court’s majority implicitly decided that federal 
separation of powers concerns outweighed what it perceived to 
be the negligible impact on California’s interest in self-
government. To allow “a private party . . . [to] have standing to 
seek relief for a generalized grievance” in contravention of 
“[t]he Article III requirement that a party invoking the 
jurisdiction of a federal court seek relief for a personal, 
particularized injury[,]” the Chief Justice declared, threatens 
“vital interests going to the role of the Judiciary in our system 
of separated powers . . . . States cannot alter that role simply 
by issuing to private parties who otherwise lack standing a 
 
184. Id. at 2671. 
185. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Cal. 2011). 
186. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2671-72 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
187. Id. at 2669 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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ticket to the federal courthouse.”188 He characterized that 
federal interest as an “overriding and time-honored concern 
about keeping the Judiciary’s power within its proper 
constitutional sphere[.]”189 
 This view reflects a “slippery slope” concern that, as 
expressed in Walter Dellinger’s amicus brief, “the Article III 
principle that federal courts cannot serve as a forum for the 
airing of generalized grievances would be drained of any 
practical meaning” if “a state can transform a generalized 
interest in a law’s enforcement from an insufficient basis for 
Article III standing into a cognizable Article III injury simply 
by relabeling it as the state’s interest.”190 The amicus brief 
argued, and apparently persuaded the majority, that “[t]he 
adoption of common-law agency as a limit on who can assert 
the state’s interest is necessary to preserve the federal courts’ 
Article III role.”191 But would the Hollingsworth Court’s 
application of the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
state law have unleashed a “parade of horribles”192 that would 
threaten to undermine the foundation of Article III standing? 
Is a strict, formalist application of standing law to determine 
the authority of initiative proponents to represent the State’s 
interest in federal court required to preserve the separation-of-
powers structure of the federal government? 
 
188. Id. at 2667; see also id. at 2661 (“The doctrine of standing, 
we recently explained, ‘serves to prevent the judicial process from 
being used to usurp the powers of the political branches. In light of 
this ‘overriding and time-honored concern about keeping the 
Judiciary’s power within its proper constitutional sphere, we must 
put aside the natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of [an] 
important dispute and to “settle” it for the sake of convenience and 
efficiency.’”). 
189. Id. at 2661 (emphasis added) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 
U.S. 811, 820 (1997)). 
190. Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents on the Issue of Standing, supra note 33, at 4 (emphasis 
added). 
191. Id. at 28. 
192. See Understanding Standing (VI), supra note 58 (referring to 
the concern expressed by the City and County of San Francisco’s 
concern expressed to the California Supreme Court in Perry v. Brown 
about the “inevitable parade of horribles” that would flow from a 
ruling untethered from text that would provide “no principled way to 
draw a line between delegating Proponents the authority to appeal on 
behalf of the State and delegating Proponents other decisions.”). 
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A formalist approach to interpreting legal doctrine can, at 
times, be justified by functional considerations such as the 
need to preserve the benefits of a uniform procedural 
framework for federal court litigation as envisioned by the 
Rules Enabling Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.193 
The Court’s opinion in Shady Grove, correctly in my view, 
chose to weight more heavily the federal judiciary’s interest in 
horizontal rules uniformity over each state’s interest in vertical 
substantive law uniformity.194 Justice Scalia’s formalist 
interpretation of Rule 23 prevailed over Justice Ginsburg’s 
functionalist approach—reminiscent of Guaranty Trust’s 
outcome determination test—that would threaten the uniform 
application of the Federal Rules. 
Unlike Rule 23, which merited the Shady Grove Court’s 
formalist approach to rules interpretation, based on the 
proposition that there exist certain inherently “procedural” 
norms195 that are distinct from those of “substantive” law that 
defines legal rights and obligations, Article III-based 
justiciability doctrine, of which “standing” is a more specific 
category,196 is liberally informed by political considerations that 
vary from case to case and judge to judge197 and “attitudes 
toward the avoidance of decision on justiciability grounds are 
apt to vary directly with perceptions as to the institutional role 
of judicial review.”198 While “[t]he threshold requirements [for 
standing] are attributed to the ‘case’ and ‘controversy’ terms 
that define the federal judicial power in Article III[,]”199 the 
text of Article III does not expressly refer to standing which is, 
rather, a creature of judicial interpretation. 
 
193. See Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State 
Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure 
Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 
1169-70 (2005). 
194. See generally The Fruits of Shady Grove, supra note 19. 
195. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
196. See 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD 
H. COOPER & RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3529 (3d ed. 2008). 
197. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles 
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
198. 13 WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER & FREER, supra note 196, at § 
3529. 
199. 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 95, at § 3531. 
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Justiciability doctrine’s indeterminacy200 renders it 
incapable of uniform, principled application in federal court 
decisions. Referring to the “malleable” nature of the precedents 
that “afford ample opportunity for courts to avoid decision on 
justiciability grounds simply because decision is thought to be 
inconvenient,” Wright, Miller, Cooper, and Freer observe that 
“[t]his opportunity has fostered a continuing debate on the 
extent to which courts should in fact be free to avoid awkward 
decisions on grounds of ‘prudence’ falling somewhere between 
implementation of strict principle and mere caprice.”201 The 
authors comment: 
 
Over the course of the Twentieth century, 
judicial opinions moved back and forth along the 
intermediate spectrum from emphasis on a policy 
that judicial review not be available freely to a 
gradually expanding concern that judicial review 
be available whenever substantial need can be 
shown.202 
 
Hollingsworth’s majority and dissenting opinions reflect 
opposite ends of this spectrum. Given the “nearly ineffable”203 
state of federal standing doctrine, the case for federal standing 
uniformity on the issue presented in Hollingsworth is weak. 
 
200. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (“Justiciability is 
itself a concept of uncertain meaning and scope.”). 
201. 13 WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER & FREER, supra note 196, at § 
3529 (“The precedents are sufficiently malleable to afford ample 
opportunity for courts to avoid decision on justiciability grounds 
simply because decision is thought inconvenient.”); see also 
Understanding Standing (I), supra note 96 (“There already has been 
much speculation, and no doubt there will be much more, about 
whether some or all of the Justices might be motivated to find a lack 
of justiciability in either or both cases in order to avoid a holding on 
the merits — and about whether they would be wise or justified in 
doing so.”). 
202. 13 WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER & FREER, supra note 196, at § 
3529. 
203. Id. at § 3529 (“Expansion of the categories of justiciable 
controversies has underscored the nearly ineffable nature of the 
judgments involved.”); see also Wymbs v. Republican State Exec. 
Comm. of Fla., 719 F.2d 1072, 1085 n.34 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
465 U.S. 1103 (1984). 
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As previously noted, the vertical choice-of-law issue in 
Hollingsworth, viewed in the light of Erie jurisprudence, is 
more comparable to Gasperini than to Shady Grove. Whereas 
Rule 23 goes into inordinate detail about the prerequisites for 
class certification, stating very explicitly that a class action 
may be “maintained” if it meets the prerequisites, Rule 59, by 
contrast, says little about the grounds for granting a new trial 
and nothing about the standard for judicial scrutiny of damage 
awards. This left Justice Ginsburg, in her Gasperini Opinion, 
with room to honor New York’s substantive interests in the 
uniform application, in state and federal courts, of the State’s 
more rigorous standard for scrutinizing damage awards.204 In 
Hollingsworth, Article III, which is the textual source of 
standing decisional law, is textually open-ended, like Rule 59, 
and does not lend itself to a categorical or formalist approach to 
standing issues. 
Notwithstanding the comparability of competing federal 
and state interests in Hollingsworth and Gasperini, two of the 
Justices—Ginsburg and Breyer—who voted with the Gasperini 
majority and with the dissent in Shady Grove to narrowly 
interpret federal law to give effect to substantive state 
interests voted with the majority in Hollingsworth to override 
 
204. Professor Steinman has invoked Gasperini to support his 
contention that Erie—not Hanna—governs the choice of law issue 
where a federal rule employs generalized language: 
 
Many aspects of federal court procedure that plaintiffs 
often seek to avoid are not dictated by the text of the 
Federal Rules. Rather, the Rules use generalized 
language that is virtually devoid of meaningful 
content. It has been the judicial gloss on those 
Rules— not the Rules themselves—that has led to the 
pro-defendant summary judgment standards that 
have held sway since the 1986 trilogy, the demanding 
pleading standard recently suggested by Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, and the federal courts' current 
hostility toward class actions. There is, therefore, a 
surprisingly strong argument that a federal court's 
choice between state and federal law on these issues 
should be treated as an unguided one. The most 
recent Supreme Court decision on this issue is 
Gasperini v. Center for the Humanities. 
 
Steinman, supra note 104, at 282-83. 
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California’s substantive interests. Justice Kennedy remained 
true to his sensitivity to state interests in the vertical choice-of-
law context by voting with the dissent in Hollingsworth and 
Shady Grove, and with the majority in Windsor in deference to 
the sovereign interest of the States in regulating domestic 
relations.205 The unusual alignment of liberal and conservative 
Justices joining in the Court’s opinion speaks more to the 
politics of the Court in avoiding a broad pronouncement about 
same-sex marriage applicable to all states than it does about 
being consistent with Erie jurisprudence, including Gasperini. 
In weighing the balance in favor of federal interests, the 
Court’s majority also seems to have minimized the harm to 
California’s interest in defending its initiatives when state 
officials decline to do so. Walter Dellinger’s amicus brief 
described to the Court several ways “for a state to guarantee a 
defense of its initiatives without conscripting federal courts to 
adjudicate the grievances of private parties who have nothing 
more than a generalized interest in an initiative’s 
enforcement.”206 Two of these methods envisioned suit in state 
court to defend an initiative, brought either by initiative 
proponents against the state Attorney General “for a binding 
determination that the initiative is constitutional” or by the 
Attorney General herself to obtain a declaratory judgment on 
the initiative’s constitutionality.207 But this state court 
approach—falling short of formal agency requirements—would 
still have denied the Proposition 8 proponents appellate review 
by the United States Supreme Court for lack of federal 
standing to appeal. A third approach suggests that the State 
require the Attorney General or other state official to defend 
 
205. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013). 
206. Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents on the Issue of Standing, supra note 33, at 30; see also 
Lederman, supra note 168 (“As Justice Breyer noted . . . the Dellinger 
brief describes several ways in which California law could be 
amended to prevent [executive officials in California from thwarting 
the initiative process by refusing to defend the initiative], including 
by providing for an independent counsel who would be required to act 
as a fiduciary of the state with the responsibility of defending 
initiatives when the Attorney General declines to do so.”). 
207. Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents on the Issue of Standing, supra note 33, at 31. 
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the initiative,208 but this would require action by a state official 
which, by implication from the rationale of the California 
Supreme Court’s holding in Perry v. Brown, is incompatible 
with the purpose of the initiative process to empower the 
People to act independently of state officials when state 
officials refuse to act. Dellinger’s fourth approach suggested 
that the State require the Attorney General “to enforce [the 
initiative] and take all possible appeals [without defending the 
initiative], while allowing the proponents or others to 
participate as amici curiae to defend the initiative on the 
merits.”209 This scenario, however, is exactly what happened in 
Windsor where Justice Scalia, in his dissent, argued 
unsuccessfully that the absence of adverseness between the 
Attorney General and the respondents should have precluded 
standing by the federal government.210 The fifth, and more 
promising, suggestion would have the state “create an 
independent office responsible for defending initiatives in cases 
in which the Attorney General declines to do so[]” subject to 
“removal for cause by the Governor or Attorney General.”211 
But even here, would independent counsel provide as vigorous 
a defense of the initiative as its official proponents? In this 
connection, Justice Kennedy’s dissent cited the California 
Supreme Court’s finding that the proponents “have a unique 
relationship to the voter-approved measure that makes them 
especially likely to be reliable and vigorous advocates for the 
measure and to be so viewed by those whose votes secured the 
initiative’s enactment . . . .”212 It is noteworthy that, in the 
wake of Hollingsworth, “initiative proponents [in California] 
have begun writing instructions into proposed laws that would 
allow them to assume the power to act on behalf of the state if 
 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 32 (emphasis added). 
210. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2701 (2013) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Article III requires not just a plaintiff (or 
appellant) who has standing to complain but an opposing party who 
denies the validity of the complaint.”). 
211. Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents on the Issue of Standing, supra note 33, at 32. 
212. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2669-70 (2013) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 
1024 (Cal. 2011)). 
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elected officials declined to do so.”213 
Even if, as a matter of vertical choice-of-law doctrine, and 
for the sake of argument, federal courts should be free to 
second-guess a State’s judgment on the qualifications of private 
parties to represent the State’s interest, how valid are the 
majority’s concerns? In part, the majority and dissenting 
Justices in Hollingsworth appeared to be sparring over the 
qualifications of initiative proponents who lack formal 
accountability to the State to represent the State’s interests. 
The Court’s Opinion expressed the majority’s concern that the 
proponents would be “free to pursue a purely ideological 
commitment to the law’s constitutionality without the need to 
take cognizance of resource constraints, changes in public 
opinion, or potential ramifications for other state priorities.”214 
A contrary view of the proponents’ qualifications was expressed 
by the California Supreme Court in Perry: 
 
The experience of California courts in reviewing 
challenges to voter-approved initiative measures 
over many years . . . teaches that permitting the 
official proponents of an initiative to participate 
as parties in postelection cases, even when public 
officials are also defending the initiative 
measure, often is essential to ensure that the 
interests and perspective of the voters who 
approved the measure are not consciously or 
unconsciously subordinated to other public 
interests that may be championed by elected 
officials[.]215 
 
The Court’s majority implied that the State’s interest is unitary 
and self-defining, and that the requirement of a formal 
appointment by the State of a party as the State’s agent is 
necessary to assure that the State’s interest, and none other, 
will be represented. Without such a formal agency relationship, 
the Court asserted, initiative proponents, who are otherwise 
 
213. Laura W. Brill, Op Ed – A lesson for California: Bad 
initiatives make bad law, Los Angeles Times, April 27, 2014. 
214. Id. at 2667. 
215. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1023-24 (emphasis added). 
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unaccountable to the State or its People, may assert their own 
generalized interests. Along these lines, Dellinger’s amicus 
brief cited “serious administrability concerns . . .” that would 
confront a federal court “when proponents disagree among 
themselves on such matters as whether to appeal, whether to 
settle the case, whether to stipulate to facts, and what 
arguments should be made.”216 
In defending an initiative’s validity, the question of whose 
interest is being asserted by a party—whether official or 
private—is a difficult one. The California Supreme Court 
observed in Perry v. Brown that there is no single, self-defining 
State or People’s interest: 
 
In many instances the interests of two or more 
public officials or entities may conflict and give 
rise to differing official views as to the validity or 
proper interpretation of a challenged state law. 
In such instances, it is not uncommon for 
different officials or entities to appear in a 
judicial proceeding as distinct parties and to be 
represented by separate counsel, each official or 
entity presenting its own perspective of the state’s 
interest with regard to the constitutional 
challenge or proposed interpretation at issue in 
the case.217 
 
216. Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents on the Issue of Standing, supra note 33, at 30. 
217. Perry, 265 P.3d at 1025-26 (emphasis added). The Supreme 
Court of California’s opinion suffers from its own ambiguity 
concerning the “interest” official proponents are authorized by 
California law to represent. Professor Lederman comments, in this 
connection: 
 
That court made numerous references to the notion 
that state law provides initiative proponents the 
authority to represent ‘the people’s interest,’ which it 
appeared to equate with ‘the state’s interest.’ The 
court was unclear, however, about whether the 
‘people’s’ interest in question is the interest of the 
people in voting for the initiative, or the interest of the 
people in enforcement of state law: The court toggled 
back and forth between references to the need ‘to 
protect the people’s right to exercise their initiative 
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The third interest to be factored into the Byrd interest-
balancing equation is the litigant’s interest in uniformity of 
outcome.218 The Supreme Court’s refusal in Hollingsworth to 
apply California law to determine the sufficiency of the 
proponents’ authority to assert the State’s interest for purposes 
of federal standing could, in the absence of a state statute 
formally appointing proponents as agents of the State, lead to a 
substantial difference in the outcome of future litigation 
challenging the constitutionality of state’s initiatives. Plaintiffs 
who file suit to challenge the constitutionality of state 
initiatives will, going forward, likely forum shop in federal 
court, where formal agency principles apply under federal 
standing law, gambling on a favorable trial court judgment 
that will be appellate-proof. If suit were brought in state court, 
parties defending the initiative, who suffer an adverse trial 
judgment, would have at least two opportunities to appeal 
within the state court system, though, ultimately, not to the 
U.S. Supreme Court which would apply federal standing 
principles as interpreted in Hollingsworth. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Hollingsworth confronted the Supreme Court with a clash 
of federal and state interests typical of the Erie issues that 
closely divided the Court in Shady Grove and Gasperini. 
Though the Court’s majority and dissenting opinions expressly 
disagreed over the weight to be accorded each interest in our 
federal system, Erie and its progeny were not explicitly 
 
power’ and the people’s interest in ‘the initiative’s 
validity.’ The latter interest appears to be the same as 
the sovereign’s interest in enforcement of its laws, and 
thus would be consistent with the idea of the 
proponents standing in for the Attorney General to 
defend the state’s own interest in preserving the 
validity of its laws. The former interest, however, is 
more akin to the interest of the lawmaking body in 
seeing to it that its legislative handiwork is honored. 
 
Understanding Standing (VI), supra note 58. 
218. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
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mentioned. Nevertheless, the conflicting choice-of-law 
judgments reflected in these opinions were made in the shadow 
of Erie. Whether or not the Court’s broad construction of 
federal standing doctrine—nominally, to avoid harming the 
federal interest in the horizontal balance of power among the 
three branches of the federal government—masked a behind-
the-scenes decision by the Court’s majority to avoid ruling on 
the merits, the Court’s Opinion upsets the vertical balance of 
power between federal and state courts that lies at the heart of 
Erie jurisprudence. 
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